Oklahoma Law Review
Volume 71 | Number 1
Symposium: Falsehoods, Fake News,
and the First Amendment
2018

The Right to Receive Foreign Speech
Joseph Thai

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Election Law Commons, and the First Amendment
Commons

Recommended Citation
Joseph Thai, The Right to Receive Foreign Speech, 71 Oᴋʟᴀ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 269 (2018).

This Panel 3: The Brave New World of Free Speech is brought to you for free and open access by University of
Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Oklahoma Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Law-LibraryDigitalCommons@ou.edu.

THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE FOREIGN SPEECH
JOSEPH THAI*
Foreign meddling in the 2016 presidential election—from Russian
hacking and leaking of Democratic National Committee emails to the
foreign power’s dissemination of fake news and other disruptive falsehoods
on major social media platforms—deeply impacted the coverage of and
campaigning by the candidates. Even if this sophisticated disinformation
operation ultimately did not change the outcome of the election, it raises
serious concerns about the vulnerability of our electoral democracy to
foreign interference and basic questions about the nature and extent of
First Amendment protection for speech from abroad, including from
speakers affiliated with hostile foreign countries.
While the First Amendment generally does not protect foreign speakers
outside of the United States, the openness of the internet to speech from
abroad and the power of vast social networking platforms to spread such
speech call for fresh consideration of First Amendment coverage on the
listener’s end of the speech relationship. This Article does that. First, it
examines the extent to which existing caselaw on the right to receive
information and ideas either already protects or might extend to safeguard
access to speech from abroad by foreign sources. Next, it considers how
traditional justifications for protecting domestic speech—truth-seeking,
self-governance, and self-realization—generally support open access to
foreign speech, and possibly even to disinformation from hostile nations in
the high stakes context of elections. Finally, this Article recommends
disclosure of the identity of foreign-state speakers and early education to
instill media literacy as policy responses to foreign meddling in the
domestic marketplace of ideas that are consonant with both First
Amendment doctrine and functions.

* Watson Centennial Chair in Law and Presidential Professor, The University of
Oklahoma. I am grateful to Mitchell Bryant and Elizabeth Byrne of the Oklahoma Law
Review for their vision and labor in organizing this symposium, the College of Law for
sponsoring it, Evelyn Aswad for her insights in moderating the panel on “The Brave New
World of Free Speech,” my co-panelists Gregory Magarian and Sonja West and symposium
participant Helen Norton for their valuable feedback, and as always my family (human,
canine, and feline) for making it all worthwhile.
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I. Introduction
Those of us who came of age watching movies in the 1980s expected
certain things of the future. Foremost, we would have flying cars, even if
time-traveling in them were not possible or advisable.1 Second, a slasher
might kill us in our sleep.2 While these two scenarios may have played—
none too seriously—to our collective adolescent optimism and anxieties, a
third possibility loomed at the edge of reality during the peak of the Cold
War: a Russian invasion.3 Well, it’s 2018, and we still don’t have flying
cars,4 Freddy Krueger has not done us in,5 and the Russians have not
come—at least not by land, sea, or air. Instead, during the 2016 presidential
campaign, the Russians invaded with words.
The Russians. Unprecedented, sophisticated, and still disputed in the
highest quarters,6 the full breadth and depth of Russian efforts to influence
the outcome of the 2016 presidential election and sow social discord in the
1. See BACK TO THE FUTURE (Universal Pictures 1985).
2. See A NIGHTMARE ON ELM STREET (New Line Cinema 1984).
3. See RED DAWN (MGM/UA 1984).
4. But see Andrew J. Hawkins, Uber’s ‘Flying Cars’ Could Arrive in LA by 2020—
And Here’s What It’ll Be Like to Ride One, VERGE (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.theverge.
com/2017/11/8/16613228/uber-flying-car-la-nasa-space-act.
5. But see A NIGHTMARE ON ELM STREET (New Line Cinema 2010).
6. See Angie Drobnic Holan, 2017 Lie of the Year: Russian Election Interference is a
‘Made-Up Story,” POLITIFACT (Dec. 12, 2017, 6:30 AM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/article/2017/dec/12/2017-lie-year-russian-election-interference-made-s/.
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United States is still being uncovered by U.S. intelligence agencies,7 the
news media,8 academics,9 and congressional10 and law enforcement
investigations.11 Leading U.S. intelligence agencies such as the CIA and
FBI have already concluded with “high confidence” that President Vladimir
Putin authorized a Russian influence campaign to “undermine public faith
in the US democratic process,” “harm [Hillary Clinton’s] electability and
potential presidency,” and “help [Donald] Trump’s election chances” by
“discrediting . . . Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to
him.”12 As part of a multifaceted campaign, Russian intelligence operatives
and affiliated individuals hacked Democratic National Committee email
accounts and shared large volumes of potentially damaging content with
Wikileaks and other outlets for public disclosure;13 employed Russianowned cable and online outlets RT and Sputnik to cast Clinton negatively
and Trump positively in news coverage laced with disinformation and to
disseminate propaganda critical of U.S. democracy;14 and employed a
7. See, e.g., Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Background to “Assessing Russian
Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections”: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident
Attribution, NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.dni.gov/
files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf.
8. See, e.g., Russian Hacking and Influence in the U.S. Election: Complete Coverage
of Russia’s Campaign to Disrupt the 2016 Presidential Election, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/news-event/russian-election-hacking (last visited Apr. 19, 2018).
9. See, e.g., Andrew Guess et al., Selective Exposure to Misinformation: Evidence from
the Consumption of Fake News During the 2016 Presidential Campaign, EUROPEAN RES.
COUNCIL (Jan. 9, 2018), http://www.dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/fake-news-2016.pdf.
10. See, e.g., Brandon Carter, Trump Asked Senate Republicans to End Russia Election
Interference Investigation, HILL (Nov. 30, 2017, 9:00 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/
administration/362708-trump-asked-senate-republicans-to-end-russia-election-interference;
Mike Memoli & Marianna Sotomayor, House Intelligence Committee Ends Russia Probe
with Party-line Vote: Democrats Vow to Continue Investigation After GOP Votes Out a
Report That Finds No Collusion, NBC NEWS (Mar. 22, 2018, 12:20 PM), https://www.nbc
news.com/politics/congress/house-intelligence-committee-ends-russia-probe-party-line-voten859126.
11. See, e.g., Kara Scannell et al., Mueller Indicts 13 Russian Nationals over 2016
Election Interference, CNN (Feb. 17, 2018, 4:33 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/16/
politics/mueller-russia-indictments-election-interference/index.html; Abigail Tracy, Donald
Trump’s Mueller Nightmare Is Coming True, VANITY FAIR (Jan. 17, 2018, 11:54 AM),
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/01/donald-trump-robert-mueller-steve-bannon.
12. Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, supra note 7, at ii.
13. See Raphael Satter, Inside Story: How Russians Hacked the Democrats’ Emails, AP
(Nov. 4, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/dea73efc01594839957c3c9a6c962b8a.
14. See Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, supra note 7, at 3–4, 6–12; Jim
Rutenberg, RT, Sputnik and Russia’s New Theory of War, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 13,
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multitude of fake social media accounts, bot networks, and trolls to spread
false and inflammatory news stories, ads, and posts from seemingly real
individuals and organizations inside the United States.15 Furthermore, when
similarly sensational and slanted stories were fabricated by other speakers
inside16 and outside the United States17 for financial or partisan gain,
Russian-affiliated bots and trolls would amplify their popularity and online
reach as part of the Kremlin’s disinformation campaign.18
Russia’s social media operations illustrate the sophistication and breadth
of this campaign of electoral influence and social division. For example,
leveraging Facebook’s advanced algorithms to target ads based on the
platform’s deep knowledge of individual users, a Russian-linked company
using fake accounts reached an estimated ten million people in the United
States with ads spreading false and inflammatory stories, videos, and other
posts attacking Clinton, supporting Trump, or playing to both sides
(depending on the sympathies of the recipients) on hot-button issues such as
policing, race, immigration, LGBT rights, and gun control—all for just
$100,000.19 That so little money could spread Kremlin messaging so far
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/magazine/rt-sputnik-and-russias-new-theoryof-war.html.
15. See Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, supra note 7, at 10–11; Massimo
Calabresi, Inside Russia’s Social Media War on America, TIME (May 18, 2017),
http://time.com/4783932/inside-russia-social-media-war-america/; John Kruzel, Russia’s
Social Media Efforts in 2016 Were Not Just False but Inflammatory, POLITIFACT (Dec. 21,
2017, 10:23 AM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2017/dec/21/russia-socialmedia-2016-false-inflammatory/; Scott Shane, The Fake Americans Russia Created to
Influence the Election, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/
us/politics/russia-facebook-twitter-election.html; Leslie Shapiro, Anatomy of a Russian
Facebook Ad, WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/
business/russian-ads-facebook-anatomy/.
16. See Marc Fisher et al., Pizzagate: From Rumor, to Hashtag, to Gunfire in D.C.,
WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/pizzagate-from-rumorto-hashtag-to-gunfire-in-dc/2016/12/06/4c7def50-bbd4-11e6-94ac-3d324840106c_story.
html.
17. See Samantha Subramanian, Inside the Macedonian Fake-News Complex, WIRED
(Feb. 25, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/veles-macedonia-fake-news/.
18. See Shane, supra note 15; see also Natalia V. Osipova & Aaron Byrd, Inside
Russia’s Network of Bots and Trolls, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2z2TIHb.
19. See Michelle Castillo, $100,000 in Russian-Bought Facebook Ads Could Have
Reached Millions of Voters, CNBC (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/29/
russian-facebook-ads-how-many-people-could-you-reach-with-100000.html; Katie Reilly,
Facebook Says 10 Million People in the U.S. Saw Russia-Linked Ads, TIME (Oct. 3, 2017),
http://time.com/4966438/facebook-russia-linked-ads-election/; Scott Shane, These Are the
Ads Russia Bought on Facebook in 2016, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.
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evidences not only successful targeting, but also an extensive and
coordinated campaign to amplify the reach of these ads through likes,
shares, and comments from fake accounts.20 For its part, Twitter has
recently disclosed that it has discovered more than 50,000 Russian-linked
accounts that, through bots and trolls, exposed nearly 700,000 Americans to
Kremlin election propaganda during the 2016 election cycle.21
Whether this Russian disinformation campaign managed to sway the
election is a matter of ongoing study22 and debate.23 Whatever consensus
might eventually emerge on this question—if any will at all24—it seems
safe to assume that the “new normal” is that Russia, if not other foreign
nytimes.com/2017/11/01/us/politics/russia-2016-election-facebook.html; Scott Shane &
Vindu Goel, Fake Russian Facebook Accounts Bought $100,000 in Political Ads, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/technology/facebook-russianpolitical-ads.html. In one vivid example of Russia stirring both sides of a hot-button social
issue, it set up one fake group on Facebook called Heart of Texas, which announced a rally
to “Stop Islamization of Texas” in Houston, and another fake group called United Muslims
of America, which called for a counter-demonstration. Fake calls to action such as these
reportedly yielded about 62,500 RSVPS. See Craig Timberg & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Russians
Got Tens of Thousands of Americans to RSVP for Their Phony Political Events on
Facebook, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2018/01/25/russians-got-tens-of-thousands-of-americans-to-rsvp-for-their-phonypolitical-events-on-facebook/?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main_facebook-815pm%3Ahomepage
%2Fstory.
20. See Shapiro, supra note 15.
21. See Sam Machkovech, Twitter Begins Emailing the 677,775 Americans Who Took
Russian Election Bait, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 19, 2018, 6:28 PM), https://arstechnica.com/
information-technology/2018/01/twitter-begins-emailing-the-677775-americans-who-tookrussian-election-bait/. John Cornyn, the second-most senior Republican in the Senate,
admitted to having interacted with such Russian propaganda on Twitter. See Brandon Carter,
Twitter Informs Cornyn He Interacted with Russia-Linked Content During 2016 Election,
HILL (Jan. 20, 2018, 4:05 PM) http://thehill.com/policy/technology/369943-twitter-informscornyn-he-interacted-with-russia-linked-content-during-2016.
22. See, e.g., Guess et al., supra note 9; see also Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow,
Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2017, at 211,
https://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/fakenews.pdf.
23. Compare, e.g., Warren Strobel, CIA’s Pompeo Asserts Russian Meddling Did Not
Sway U.S. Election Result, REUTERS (Oct. 19, 2017, 8:09 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-trump-russia/cias-pompeo-asserts-russian-meddling-did-not-sway-u-s-election
-result-idUSKBN1CP028, with Graham Lanktree, Did Trump Really Win the Election?,
NEWSWEEK (Nov. 8, 2017, 4:11 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/did-trump-really-winelection-703431.
24. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128–29 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing
that “we may never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year’s
Presidential election”).
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adversaries as well, will expand on this playbook to meddle in future
elections and attempt to sow further discord among the electorate with
weaponized words from abroad.25
The Court. While the Russians to date have not directed their influence
campaign at the judiciary, case law seems to have aligned in support of a
robust right to receive foreign speech. Over the course of a century, and
accelerating under the Roberts Court, precedents have given increasing
substance and scope to a First Amendment right to receive information and
ideas. By language and logic, if not always by express holdings, these
decisions offer fair to firm support for a right extensive enough to protect
domestic access to speech from foreign speakers and even hostile foreign
governments, and strong enough to cast doubt on the constitutionality of
restricting access to foreign speech—even if such speech may promote
falsehoods in the electoral context.
Furthermore, while the sovereign power of the federal government may
still give it some leeway to deny entry at the border to speech and speakers
from abroad, the digitization and globalization of speech on the internet has
made physical border restrictions largely irrelevant. Touching on this mass
migration of expression onto the internet, the Court’s online speech cases
have made clear that the Court may be as vigilantly protective of speech in
cyberspace as it is of speech in traditional public forums. In short, foreign
speech has never been more abundant or accessible to domestic listeners,
and the listeners’ right to receive it has never been more robust as a matter
of First Amendment doctrine.
Russia’s influence campaign and the Court’s free speech jurisprudence
are thus on course to either collude or collide. This Article will attempt to
sort out which. As background, Part II will set out the different
constitutional statuses of foreign speakers inside and outside the United
States, with the former enjoying some First Amendment protection and the
latter enjoying none. Part III will trace the century-long doctrinal
development of what Justice Marshall has referred to as the other side of
25. Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, supra note 7, at 5; see Nicole Gaouette, U.S.
Must Act Now to Ward Off More Russian Election Meddling, Report Says, CNN (Jan. 10,
2018), http://www.cnn.com/2018/01/10/politics/us-russia-election-meddling-cardin-report/
index.html; Miles Parks, 5 Ways Election Interference Could (and Probably Will) Worsen in
2018 and Beyond, NPR (Jan. 27, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/27/
579683042/5-ways-election-interference-could-and-probably-will-worsen-in-2018-andbeyond; Matthew Rosenberg et al., Russia Sees Midterm Elections as Chance to Sow Fresh
Discord, Intelligence Chiefs Warn, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/02/13/us/politics/russia-sees-midterm-elections-as-chance-to-sow-fresh-discordintelligence-chiefs-warn.html.
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the coin of the right to speak—the right to receive information and ideas—
and its remarkable solidification under the Roberts Court. Although the
Court has not said in so many words that this right to access an open
marketplace of ideas, unfiltered by speaker, speech value, or perhaps even
veracity, extends generally to all speech from abroad, its judicial opinions
strongly suggest so. Part IV will then consider whether this precedential
conclusion is consistent with the commonly agreed upon functions of the
First Amendment—promoting the search for truth, democratic selfgovernance, and self-realization—concluding with some caveats that it is.
Finally, among the various policy proposals responding to the perceived
threat that the online spread of disinformation poses to democracy, Part V
recommends pursuing at least two that may be both effective and consonant
with First Amendment doctrine and functions: identifying and disclosing
speech affiliated with foreign nations, and promoting education in media
literacy from an early age.
II. The First Amendment Rights of Foreign Speakers
Whether foreign speakers can invoke the protections of the First
Amendment generally depends on whether they are physically inside or
outside the United States.
Inside, foreign speakers appear to enjoy much—perhaps nearly all—of
the freedom of speech that American citizens do. As a general matter, the
Court has long recognized that “once an alien lawfully enters and resides in
this country he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution.”26 Indeed, over half a century ago, the Court declared that
“[f]reedom of speech and of the press is accorded aliens residing in this
country.”27 Consistent with this recognition, the Court has since confirmed
that aliens inside the country “enjoy certain constitutional rights,” including
“First Amendment rights.”28 The Court has not decided or suggested that
the First Amendment rights enjoyed by aliens lawfully residing within the
United States are less extensive than those enjoyed by U.S. citizens.29
26. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953) (quoting Bridges v.
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring)).
27. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 148 (majority opinion).
28. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 270, 271 (1990).
29. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s textual argument that the First Amendment
protects “the people,” including aliens who are “part of the national community” because of
their “sufficient connection with this country,” see infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text,
implies that the free speech rights of lawful resident aliens and U.S. citizens are
coterminous.
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In contrast, outside the United States, foreign speakers would be hard
pressed to claim any First Amendment protection for themselves. While the
Court and scholars have assumed that “First Amendment protections reach
beyond our national boundaries” for U.S. citizens abroad, restricting the
ability of the government to burden citizens’ expressive activities outside
the United States,30 the Court has neither held nor assumed that foreign
speakers abroad enjoy any First Amendment protection. Indeed, at least a
plurality on the Court has assumed the opposite.
In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
plurality opinion held that the rights of “the people” protected by the text of
the Fourth Amendment do not extend outside the United States to noncitizens.31 They are not the “class of persons who are part of a national
community or . . . have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this
country to be considered part of that community.”32 Of particular relevance
here, the plurality noted that the text of the First and Second Amendments
similarly extend their protections to—and only to—“the people.”33 In his
concurrence, Justice Kennedy disavowed this textual limitation on the reach
of those amendments, instead arguing that “general principles of
interpretation” must decide the applicability and extent of the constitutional
restrictions the United States “must observe with reference to aliens beyond
its territory.”34 But neither Justice Kennedy nor any other Justice has since
suggested that the First Amendment’s protections extend generally to
foreigners outside the United States.
At most, Boumediene v. Bush cracked the door for aliens outside the
United States to raise constitutional claims regarding the legality or
conditions of their confinement.35 There, the Court through Justice Kennedy
held that the Constitution’s prohibition against suspending the writ of
habeas corpus applied to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where alien terrorism

30. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308 (1981); cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957)
(“When the government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the
Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should
not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another land.”); see Timothy Zick,
Territoriality and the First Amendment: Free Speech at—and Beyond—Our Borders, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1543, 1593 (2010) (“Extension of First Amendment protections to
U.S. citizens located abroad would seem to be supported by text, theory, and precedent.”).
31. 494 U.S. 259, 275 (1990).
32. Id. at 265.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
35. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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detainees sought to invoke the writ to challenge their detention.36 But the
Court underscored that its decision “does not address the content of the
law”—including any constitutional claim—“that governs petitioners’
detention,” which is “a matter yet to be determined.”37
Even if any of the substantive protections of the Constitution might
arguably protect aliens to some extent at Guantanamo Bay, the Court’s
recognition of that possibility turned in large part on Guantanamo Bay’s
unique status as a territory over which the United States exercises “de facto
sovereignty” by virtue of its “complete jurisdiction and control over the
base.”38 Similarly, in Hernandez v. Mesa,39 the Court confronted but
ultimately avoided the question of whether the Fourth Amendment’s
protection would extend to a foreign citizen shot and killed by a U.S. border
patrol agent standing on the opposite side of a shared culvert across which
ran the U.S.-Mexican border. Justice Breyer, however, argued in his dissent
that, consistent with Boumediene, “practical concerns” such as the shared
physical features and administration of this “special border-related area”
established that the culvert had “sufficient involvement with, and
connection to, the United States,” such that it was governed by the Fourth
Amendment.40
Given the sui generis characteristics of the territories at issue in
Boumediene and Hernandez, it is highly doubtful—and, at best, not
foreclosed—that, as a matter of doctrine, the protections of the First
Amendment would extend generally to foreigners outside of the territorial
United States. Neither have scholars seriously argued for such an extension
of the First Amendment.41 Instead, if First Amendment protection is to
extend to speech from foreign speakers outside of the United States, it must
find its precedential footing elsewhere.

36. Id. at 771.
37. Id. at 798.
38. Id. at 754.
39. 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017).
40. Id. at 2009, 2011 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
41. Compare Helen Norton, (At Least) Thirteen Ways of Looking at Election Lies, 71
OKLA. L. REV. 117, 121 (2018) (“Foreign speakers may not have any autonomy interests
protected by the First Amendment . . . .”), with Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial
Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 288 (2009) (observing that
the “functional approach” taken by Boumediene “do[es] not require the categorical denial of
extraterritorial free speech rights either to citizens or to foreign nationals”).
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III. The Right to Receive (Foreign) Information and Ideas
Given that the sparse case law and scholarship are generally dismissive
of First Amendment protection for foreign speakers abroad, it is useful to
take stock of the extent to which their speech is already shielded by existing
doctrine independent of the geographic location and national identity of the
speaker. The most pertinent First Amendment principle, and potentially the
most protective of foreign speech, is the right to receive information and
ideas that the Court has recognized in different contexts throughout the last
century.42
Scholars have acknowledged the existence of a right to receive
information and ideas for decades,43 and lower courts as well as scholars
have recently focused on the application of that right in the context of video
recording.44 But the development and contours of a right to receive
information and ideas have not received extensive treatment in either
judicial decisions or scholarly literature.45 Nor has discussion of the right
42. Professors Massaro and Norton analogously explore the First Amendment interest in
protecting the speech of robots, who themselves may enjoy rights as speakers, based on the
“First Amendment value [of their speech] to human listeners.” Toni M. Massaro & Helen
Norton, Siri-ously? Free Speech Rights and Artificial Intelligence, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1169,
1178 (2016).
43. See, e.g., JEROME A. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? THE RIGHT OF
ACCESS TO MASS MEDIA 145 (1973) (discussing a First Amendment focus on the listener as
“a pioneering concept which is not yet fully developed or understood”); MARTIN H. REDISH,
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 47 (1984) (noting that, to further the selfrealization function of the First Amendment, “the individual needs an uninhibited flow of
information and opinion to aid him or her in making life-affecting decisions, in governing
his or her own life”).
44. See, e.g., W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, 869 F.3d 1189, 1196, 1197 (10th Cir.
2017) (noting agreement among circuit courts that “the First Amendment protects the
recording of officials’ conduct in public” and recognizing that “the First Amendment
provides at least some degree of protection for gathering news and information” (first citing
Fields v. City of Phila., 862 F.3d 353, 358 (3d Cir. 2017) and then quoting ACLU of Ill. v.
Alvarez, 769 F.3d 583, 597 (7th Cir. 2012)); Marc Blitz et al., Regulating Drones Under the
First and Fourth Amendments, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 85–109 (2015) (considering the
contours of a First Amendment right to record and gather information “on the ground and in
the air”); Justin Marceau & Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and Democracy in the Video Age,
116 COLUM. L. REV. 991 (2016) (arguing that “video recording is a form of expression or at
the very least, is conduct that serves as a necessary precursor of expression such that it
counts as speech under the First Amendment”).
45. See Catherine J. Ross, An Emerging Right for Mature Minors to Receive
Information, 2 U. PENN. J. CON. L. 223, 230 (1999) (noting that, “[d]espite its importance,
the right to receive information remains a relatively unexplored aspect of the freedom of
speech” both in case law and in scholarship).
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caught up with the exceptionally broad, robust free speech decisions of the
Roberts Court. This Part fills the gap in the literature by tracing the
development of the right to receive information and ideas across key
Supreme Court precedents.
A. Establishing the Right to Receive Information and Ideas
Stanley. A good starting place to survey the size and shape of the right to
receive information and ideas is Stanley v. Georgia, the 1969 case that
declared the right to be “now well established.”46 Stanley overturned a
conviction for in-home possession of obscenity, which was one of the
“well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech”47 that the Court had
reaffirmed a decade earlier as falling outside the protection of the First
Amendment for being “utterly without redeeming social importance.”48
Nevertheless, Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Stanley Court declared that
the “right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social
worth, . . . is fundamental to our free society.”49 The Court explained that
this First Amendment liberty encompasses the right “to read or observe
what [one] pleases,” and that it gains “an added dimension” when exercised
“in the privacy of a person’s own home.”50 In the home, the right to privacy
recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut as a freedom from government
intrusion51 fortifies the right to receive information and ideas to such an
extent that the state’s “broad power to regulate obscenity” is wholly
curtailed.52 The state consequently has “no business telling a man, sitting
alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may
watch,” even if those books or films otherwise lack First Amendment
protection.53
Pierce and Meyer. In addition to leveraging Griswold, the Stanley Court
cited a handful of cases to lend substance to the right to receive information
and ideas and to support its statement that the right was well-established.
Oldest among them was Pierce v. Society of Sisters, which in 1925
46. 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
47. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
48. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
49. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564 (citing Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)).
50. Id. at 564, 565.
51. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
52. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568; cf. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 44 (1973) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the Court’s treatment and definition of obscenity as a
category of unprotected speech, stating that “the right to know is the corollary of the right to
speak or publish”).
53. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.
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recognized the constitutional right of parents to educate their children
outside the confines of state-run public schools.54 Pierce, along with Meyer
v. Nebraska, which in 1923 invalidated an English-only teaching
requirement for public and private schools,55 established that “the State may
not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the
spectrum of available knowledge.”56 Such an unconstitutional contraction
could occur not only on the giving end (abridging “the right to utter or to
print”), but also, as these early cases illustrate, on the receiving end
(abridging “the right to receive, the right to read”).57 Moreover, the right to
receive is broad enough to encompass the freedom of parents to have their
children acquire knowledge of “foreign tongues and ideals”—even those of
a nation recently at war with the United States.58
Lamont. While Meyer recognized that the “spectrum of available
knowledge”59 protected by the First Amendment extends to foreign
information and ideas, the case only implicated speakers within the United
States—teachers of “German, French, Spanish, Italian, and every other
alien speech.”60 But a second decision cited by the Court in Stanley, the
1965 case of Lamont v. Postmaster General,61 made clear that the right to
which it referred also extends to information and ideas disseminated by
speakers abroad.
In Lamont, the Court struck down a federal statute directing the
Postmaster General to detain “communist political propaganda” that “is
printed or otherwise prepared in a foreign country,” to notify the addressee
that the material was received, and to deliver it only upon the addressee’s
request.62 The statute incorporated the meaning of “political propaganda”
from the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, which defined the term
broadly to encompass any expressive material intended to “influence a
recipient . . . with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or
relations” of a foreign country; any speech promoting “racial, social,
political, or religious disorder, civil riot, or other conflict involving the use
of force or violence”; and any advocacy for “the overthrow of any
54. Id. at 564 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
55. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
56. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482.
57. Id.
58. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401. The petitioner had been convicted under the Nebraska
statute for teaching German in a parochial school. See id. at 396.
59. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
60. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401.
61. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
62. Id. at 302.
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government” within the United States by “force or violence.”63 Though the
barrier to receipt of this extensive class of speech from abroad could be
lifted by an addressee simply returning a notice card, the Court through
Justice Douglas unhesitatingly found the “limitation on the unfettered
exercise of the addressee’s First Amendment rights” to be “at war with the
‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate and discussion that are
contemplated by the First Amendment.”64 The government could not,
consistent with the freedom of speech, “control the flow of ideas to the
public” even in this limited and pregnable fashion, and even with respect to
the speech of hostile foreign governments advocating civil riot or violent
upheaval.65
The concurring opinion by Justice Brennan, which was cited in Stanley,66
made explicit that the “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” marketplace of
ideas to which the Lamont majority referred (quoting his landmark opinion
for the Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan67) necessarily includes “the
right to receive” speech.68 “The dissemination of ideas can accomplish
nothing,” he wrote, “if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive
and consider them,” leaving “a barren marketplace of ideas that had only
sellers and no buyers.”69 In the face of this essential relationship between
the free speech rights of speakers and recipients, the government’s asserted
interest in protecting “the unwilling recipient” from potentially offensive
speech cannot trump the right of other audience members to receive it
where a ready self-help remedy (for instance, requesting that the Post
Office block such material) could “fully safeguard[]” their sensibilities.70
Martin. Supporting Justice Brennan’s points and completing Stanley’s
citation list is Martin v. City of Struthers, where the Court invalidated a
municipal ban on door-to-door distribution of handbills, circulars, and
advertisements.71 The Court explained that the “broad scope” of the
freedom of speech “embraces the right to distribute literature and
necessarily protects the right to receive it.”72 Both are so “clearly vital to
the preservation of a free society” that any “naked restriction of the
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 302 n.1 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 611(j) (internal quotations omitted)).
Id. at 305, 307 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
Id. at 306.
Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564.
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
Lamont, 381 U.S. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 310.
319 U.S. 141 (1943).
Id. at 143 (internal citation omitted).
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dissemination of ideas” on either end cannot stand where “traditional legal
methods” can address any purported “dangers of distribution.”73 As
examples, the Court cited trespass-after-warning statutes and similar laws
that “leave[] the decision as to whether distributors of literature may
lawfully call at a home where it belongs—with the homeowner.”74
In sum, piecing together Stanley and the cases it collects under the rubric
of the right to receive information and ideas, a picture emerges of the nature
and extent to which that right was recognized. First, it can be said that
Stanley’s view of the right as “now well established” was not a stretch.75 In
multiple cases, across different decades and contexts, the Court invoked
that right to strike down regulations that interfered with the ability of
individuals to receive speech.76 Second, the right protects speech regardless
of the subject or viewpoint. Indeed, the right even extended to speech
advocating violent overthrow (Lamont) and, at least with reinforcement
from the right to privacy in the home, to speech that otherwise lacked
sufficient social worth to warrant First Amendment protection (Stanley).
Third, the right to receive information and ideas operated prophylactically,
preventing the government from restraining speech distribution on a
wholesale basis in order to protect potentially unwilling listeners who
themselves possessed the power to block receipt on an individual basis
(Lamont and Martin). Fourth, and most significantly for the subject of this
Article, the right to receive information and ideas did not seem to depend
on either the nationality of the speaker or the geographic origin of the
speech. The right had secured uninhibited access to foreign speakers from
both inside (Meyer) and outside (Lamont) the country, from humble foreign
language teachers to hostile foreign powers.
B. Limiting the Right to Receive Information and Ideas at the Borders
The broad and robust right to receive information and ideas delineated
above well served the Stanley Court’s substantive end: striking down the
73. Id. at 146–47.
74. Id. at 148.
75. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
76. In addition to the cases cited or discussed in Stanley, a handful of other pre-Stanley
decisions directly or indirectly reference the right to receive information and ideas. See, e.g.,
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (in upholding FCC’s “fairness
doctrine,” observing that “[i]t is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social,
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here”); Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945) (invalidating registration requirement for soliciting union
membership as both a restriction on “right to speak” of labor organizers as well as “rights of
the workers to hear”).
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application of the obscenity statute to in-home consumption of expressive
material. But the right was drawn incompletely in a number of important
respects, and subsequently limited at the borders by Court majorities with
less expansive views of the right.
For starters, with one exception, neither Stanley nor the cases on which it
relied suggested any specific or significant limits on the reach of the right.
The exception was Stanley’s acknowledgement that the state’s “broad
power” to regulate obscenity—and, presumably, other historically
unprotected categories of speech77—is not disturbed outside of the home,
where the right to receive information and ideas is not commingled with
“an added dimension” of the right to privacy.78 Apart from this exception,
the right to receive information and ideas at Stanley’s time seemed to
extend as far as the right to utter or print them, with “buyers and sellers”
deemed equally essential for a functioning marketplace of ideas.79
But even viewing the right to receive information and ideas as codependent and co-extensive with the right to speak, some limits suggest
themselves. Most basically, just as the First Amendment famously would
not protect a speaker “shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic,”80 the
right to receive information and ideas surely is not absolute either. A
listener in a crowded theater could not insist on a right to hear someone
shouting “fire.” Other easy examples come to mind. For instance, just as
one could not claim a First Amendment right to break into someone else’s
home to speak to them,81 one would not enjoy the right to break into
someone’s home to listen to them speak.
More significantly, the federal government’s historically broad power to
control the movement of materials and people at the national border can
conflict directly with an unlimited right to receive information and ideas
from abroad. The Court has repeatedly recognized the “long-standing right
of the sovereign to protect itself” against the entry of harmful items and
individuals.82 Consequently, the Court has time and again upheld
warrantless border searches and seizures against Fourth Amendment

77. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
80. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
81. See Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568 (1972) (“[T]his Court has never
held that a trespasser or an uninvited guest may exercise general rights of free speech on
property privately owned and used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only.”).
82. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616, 619 (1977).
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challenges as “reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the
border.”83
12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film. First Amendment challenges to
the denial of entry have not fared well either, even in the wake of Stanley
and Lamont. For example, in 1973, the Court through Chief Justice Burger
upheld the application of the Tariff Act of 1930, which banned the
importation of “obscene or immoral” materials,84 to the border seizure of
sexually explicit films, slides, photographs, and prints from Mexico.85
Responding to the contention that Stanley prevented the government from
restricting the transportation of obscenity “for private, personal use and
possession only”—including the importation of obscenity from abroad—the
Court first noted that “[i]mport restrictions and searches of persons or
packages at the national borders rest on different considerations and
different rules of constitutional law from domestic regulations.”86 With
respect to packages and other items, those “different considerations and
different rules” derive from “the complete power of Congress over foreign
commerce” pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution and its
consequent “plenary power . . . to regulate imports.”87 The Court curtly
limited and distinguished Stanley on the ground that “Stanley’s emphasis
was on the freedom of thought and mind in the privacy of the home,” and
that “a port of entry is not a traveler’s home.”88 The Court made no mention
of the right to receive information and ideas, even though Stanley, in
reinforcing the right within the home, had recognized it as “well
established” outside of the home.
Mandel and R.A.V. As with expressive items, so too with individuals
seeking entry to address domestic audiences. Most notably, in the 1972 case
of Kleindienst v. Mandel, the Court upheld the exclusion of a Belgian who
sought a non-immigrant visa to participate in academic conferences and
give lectures across the country.89 The foreigner speaker, Ernest Mandel,
was a self-described “revolutionary Marxist” subject to the categorical
exclusion of communists under the Immigration and Nationality Act of
83. Id. at 616.
84. 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (2012).
85. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 129 (1973).
86. Id. at 125.
87. Id. at 126 (quoting Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904)).
88. Id. at 128–29 (internal quotation marks omitted). The quoted language comes from
United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, wherein a plurality of the Court had reached
the same conclusion, albeit in dicta. See 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971).
89. 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972).
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1952 unless granted a waiver by the Attorney General on the
recommendation of the Secretary of State.90 Mandel had entered the country
twice before on waivers—once to work as a journalist and a second time to
give speeches at universities—but this third time he was denied a waiver on
the ground that his last visit had exceeded its stated purposes.91
In an opinion by Justice Blackmun, the Court first foreclosed any
possibility that Mandel himself could assert a First Amendment or other
constitutional claim to entry. Starkly put, given “plenary congressional
power” to regulate the entry of foreigners, “an unadmitted and nonresident
alien” has “no constitutional right of entry to this country as a
nonimmigrant or otherwise.”92
With Mandel’s own claims foreclosed, the case presented the question
whether the government’s exclusion violated the First Amendment right to
receive information and ideas of the academics who had invited him to
speak and joined in his lawsuit.93 The Court was not impressed with the
government’s attempt to sidestep this free speech question with the
argument that it had only limited “physical movement” into the country.94
After all, the Court noted, Lamont also involved the government’s
regulation of physical entry (there, of mail) into the country.95 Nor did the
Court buy the government’s argument that the domestic audience members’
right to receive information and ideas was not burdened because they still
had access to Mandel’s books and published speeches, as well as to
recordings and telephonic communications.96 Drawing perhaps from its
own individual and institutional experiences, the Court was “loath to hold”
that such alternatives would extinguish an audience’s First Amendment
interest in receiving information and ideas in person given the “particular
qualities inherent in sustained, face-to-face debate, discussion and
questioning.”97

90. Id. at 755, 756 (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Id. at 756–57. He gave lectures at more universities than stated in his visa
application and, contrary to the terms of his visa, appeared at an event where political
contributions were solicited. See id. at 758 n.5.
92. Id. at 762, 769.
93. See id. at 754, 762.
94. Id. at 764.
95. Id. at 765.
96. See id.
97. Id. Justice Marshall explicitly drew on “the essential place of oral argument in this
Court’s work” that “the availability to us of briefs and exhibits does not supplant.” Id. at 776
n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Having recognized the burden on the right to receive information and
ideas imposed by the government’s denial of entry to a foreign speaker, the
Court nevertheless rejected the claim on the merits. On one hand, the Court
again invoked the plenary power of Congress to regulate entry and “to
exclude aliens altogether”—a “firmly established” power “inherent in
sovereignty, necessary for maintaining normal international relations and
defending the country against foreign encroachments and dangers.”98 On
the other hand, the Court reasoned that the audience members’ First
Amendment argument “would prove too much.”99 Either every domestic
audience member’s claim would prevail, thereby rendering the historic
power of the political branches to exclude aliens “a nullity,” or courts
would be required to weigh the strength of the audience’s First Amendment
interests against the government’s interests as to each particular alien,
“[t]he dangers and the undesirability” of such a judicial approach appearing
“obvious” to the Court.100 Therefore, as long as the government offered a
“facially legitimate and bona fide” reason for excluding an alien, the Court
would neither “look behind” that justification “nor test it by balancing [the]
justification against the First Amendment interests” of affected audience
members.101
In dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, argued that
“established First Amendment law” compelled the opposite outcome.102
Echoing Justice Brennan’s opinion in Lamont, Justice Marshall stressed that
“the right to speak and hear—including the right to inform others and to be
informed about public issues—are inextricably part of [the same] process”
of public discussion protected by the First Amendment—“two sides of the
same coin.”103 Furthermore, dismissing the unpalatable First Amendment
approaches posited by the majority, Justice Marshall contended that the
Court’s cases already settled on a different approach, prohibiting the
government from restricting the advocacy of ideas, including communist
doctrine, “divorced from incitement to imminent lawless action.”104
Consequently, short of excluding incitement as narrowly defined in

98. Id. at 765, 766 (majority opinion) (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698, 705 (1983)).
99. Id. at 768, 769.
100. Id. at 769.
101. Id. at 770.
102. Id. at 781 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 775.
104. Id. at 780.
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Brandenburg v. Ohio,105 the government “may not selectively pick and
choose which ideas it will let into the country.”106
Together, 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film107 and Mandel permit
the government to erect two kinds of barriers, different in substance and
scope, to the entry of foreign items and individuals for expressive purposes.
12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film at least allows the government to stop
the cross-border “flow of ideas to the public” when those ideas are obscene.
In addition, if Stanley did not disturb the government’s “broad power” to
regulate obscenity outside the home as a class of unprotected speech, then it
presumably did not curtail the government’s power to regulate other
categories of unprotected speech outside the home, including at the
border.108
Mandel seems to sweep much more broadly, permitting the exclusion of
any foreign speaker regardless of the First Amendment status of the
anticipated speech. Thus, as a precedential matter, it appears that the
government’s historically plenary power to control the entry of items and
individuals into the country might be fairly limited by the First Amendment
when it comes to the former—items—but hardly limited, if at all, when it
comes to the latter—individuals.
The scope of any restrictions on the government’s power to control entry
remains an open question in several significant respects. First, with respect
to the import of expressive materials, do Lamont and 12 200-Ft. Reels of
Super 8MM. Film cover the entire range of First Amendment outcomes?
Possibly. Justice Douglas’s characteristically capacious rights language for
the majority in Lamont lends itself to maximalist construction. Any
restriction on the “unfettered exercise” of the right to receive information
and ideas, even a temporary and pregnable one at the border, is arguably “at
war” with the “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” marketplace of ideas
protected by the First Amendment.109 Indeed, the opinion notes that it was
not “deal[ing] with the right of Customs to inspect material from abroad for
contraband,” and that qualification can be read to suggest that the
government’s power to restrict the importation of expressive materials from
abroad is limited to the narrow categories of speech that the government
105. 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969).
106. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 780 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
107. It is no doubt possible to short form this case name further, but the name would then
be less fun.
108. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
109. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 307 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964)).
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can lawfully outlaw, such as obscenity and incitement, because they lie
beyond the protection of the First Amendment.110 Domestic audiences are
entitled to receive all other speech from abroad, even propaganda from
hostile foreign powers or speech advocating domestic lawlessness and
violence.111
This maximalist reading of Lamont is supported by Justice Brennan’s
concurring opinion in that case, which refused to countenance even a
“minor” restriction on the right to receive information and ideas from
abroad on the ground that it would open the door to worse
encroachments.112 His concurrence also read the First Amendment as
barring the government from blocking foreign propaganda at the border.113
In short, notwithstanding the government’s plenary power to regulate
imports, it has no more constitutional authority to restrict foreign speech
from reaching domestic audiences than it has to restrict the distribution of
speech within its borders because of the First Amendment right of domestic
audience members to receive both.
Second, the Court’s subsequent decision in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul
might limit the government’s “plenary power” to exclude expressive
materials and aliens seeking entry to speak to domestic listeners.114 Under
R.A.V., the government may censor any kind of unprotected speech
“because of [its] constitutionally proscribable content,” but may not
suppress such speech for content-based reasons “unrelated to [its]
distinctively proscribable content,” such as suppressing political viewpoints
that the government disagrees with.115 If applied to the border, R.A.V.
would allow the government to continue blocking speakers and speech to
protect the country from the particular social harms associated with
obscenity, incitement, and other kinds of unprotected speech, but would bar
the government from denying entry to “drive certain ideas or viewpoints”
unrelated to those harms “from the marketplace”—for example, to suppress

110. Id. at 307.
111. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
112. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 309 (Brennan, J., concurring).
113. See id. at 310 (“That the governments which originate this propaganda themselves
have no equivalent guarantees only highlights the cherished values of our constitutional
framework; it can never justify emulating the practice of restrictive regimes in the name of
expediency.”).
114. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
115. Id. at 383, 384, 388 (italics omitted).
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content critical of the United States or democracy. 116 R.A.V. therefore
strongly suggests that excluding aliens at the border based on the political
viewpoints they would share with domestic listeners would not qualify as a
“facially legitimate and bona fide” reason under Mandel.117
Keene. In Meese v. Keene, the Court upheld a provision of the Foreign
Agents Registration Act of 1938 requiring foreign agents seeking to
distribute “political propaganda” within the United States to file a copy
with the Attorney General, report on the extent of the dissemination, and
label the expressive material with certain information, including the identity
of the foreign agent and the fact that the material is registered with the
Department of Justice.118 Justice Stevens’s majority opinion distinguished
Lamont on the ground that “the Act places no burden on protected
expression,” as it “does not pose any obstacle” to domestic distribution of
or access to the foreign political propaganda, but “simply require[s] the
disseminators of such material to make additional disclosures that would
better enable the public to evaluate the import of the propaganda.”119 As for
the government’s designation of the material as “political propaganda”—
the same statutory definition that was adopted by the regulation at issue in
Lamont, and which ranged from expressive materials intended to influence
opinions about other countries to advocacy of civil riot and violent
overthrow in the United States120—the Court asserted that the term is “a
broad, neutral one rather than a pejorative one.”121 Given this “neutral
definition,” the majority concluded that any “constitutional concerns” with
the government burdening disfavored speech with a scarlet letter
“completely disappear.”122
Justice Blackmun’s dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
called into question the majority’s neutral characterization of the “political
propaganda” label. He noted that the Act grew out of the House UnAmerican Activities Committee’s efforts to counter foreign agents and
propaganda.123 Furthermore, he argued that the classification would both
chill the dissemination of the regulated materials, as “individuals and
116. Id. at 387 (internal quotations omitted). Though R.A.V. did not involve border
crossings, the categorical language and logic of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion do not
invite exception either. See id. at 383–90.
117. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
118. 481 U.S. 465, 470–71 (1987).
119. Id. at 480.
120. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
121. Keene, 481 U.S. at 483.
122. Id. at 485.
123. See id. at 487.
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institutions are bound to calculate the risk of being associated with
materials officially classified as propaganda,” and “reduce the effectiveness
of the speech” that is disseminated through a label that “lessen[s] its
credence with viewers.”124 Finally, he contended that such a “saddling” of
speech could not be justified, as it must, by “a compelling governmental
interest.”125
In sum, after Stanley in 1969 declared the right to receive information
and ideas “well established,” putting it on a seemingly equal footing with
the right to speak, a series of border cases cast into doubt the reach and
robustness of the right. At minimum, the traditional plenary power of the
sovereign to exclude dangerous substances at the border permits it to block
the importation of expressive material that domestic audience members
cannot claim a right to receive because the content is obscene or otherwise
lacking in First Amendment protection. Furthermore, even if the expressive
material does not fall into a category of unprotected speech, the government
may require that materials of a political nature from foreign governments
and agents (that is, “political propaganda”) be disclosed in some fashion so
that the public may be informed of its nature and source. Finally, the
government may deny foreigners entry—including foreigners invited to
speak to domestic audiences—without First Amendment constraint so long
as it offers a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason for doing so.126
Importantly, however, because the reason upheld in Mandel involved
violations of past visa conditions rather than speech-related reasons, it is not
clear whether the wide berth the Court gave to the “firmly established”
power of the government “to exclude aliens altogether”127 would allow it to
deny aliens entry for anticipated speech that might be protected, but that the
government views as dangerous—for example, because the speaker might
spread “fake news”128 or other inimical foreign propaganda. The Mandel
124. Id. at 491–92, 493.
125. Id. at 493.
126. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
128. I use the term “fake news” throughout this article to refer to news stories that
promote factual falsehoods for the purpose of misleading the listener. Cf. Allcott &
Gentzkow, supra note 22, at 213–14 (defining “fake news to be news articles that are
intentionally and verifiably false, and could mislead readers,” but not “unintentional
reporting mistakes,” “rumors,” “conspiracy theories,” “satire,” “false statements by
politicians,” or “reports that are slanted or misleading but not outright false”). Commentators
have validly criticized the continued use of this term because it “oversimplifies a very
complex problem” and has been appropriated by politicians and partisans to undermine
independent journalism by attaching the label to “any piece of information that [they] didn’t
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Court’s unanimous recognition of the burden that the exclusion of foreign
speakers imposed on the right of domestic audiences to receive their ideas,
dispositive for the dissent but not the majority, at least indicates that a
speech-related denial would present a closer question. And the Court’s
subsequent decision in R.A.V. strongly suggests that the government indeed
cannot bar speakers or speech (even unprotected) at the border based on its
disagreement with the foreign message or viewpoint.
C. Fortifying the Right to Receive Information and Ideas
In the decades since cases such as Mandel, decisions involving
expression as diverse as sexually explicit speech, school libraries,
electioneering communications, prescription drug marketing, violent video
games, crush videos, and military lies have tended to add further support
and shape to the previously “well established” right to receive information
and ideas. Several of these cases come from the highly speech-protective
Roberts Court, which has vigorously fortified the right in all but name.
1. Erogenous Zoning
Cases upholding government authority to zone sexually explicit or
indecent speech could be taken to further limit the right to receive
information and ideas, extending the government’s authority to block entry
into the marketplace of ideas physically beyond the border and topically
beyond obscene or otherwise unprotected speech. In Young v. American
Mini Theaters, for example, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
upheld a regulation zoning adult movie theaters away from residential
neighborhoods partly on the ground that “few of us would march our sons
and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen’s right to see ‘Specified
Sexual Activities’ exhibited in the theaters of our choice.”129 Dissenting
against the implication that popular opinion or perceived value determines
how widely speech may be disseminated for the “few” who may have
interest in receiving it, Justice Stewart responded that “[t]he guarantees of

like.” Hossein Derakhshan & Claire Wardle, Ban the Term ‘Fake News,” CNN (Nov. 27,
2017, 3:12 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/26/ opinions/fake-news-and-disinformationopinion-wardle-derakhshan/index.html; see also Meg Kelly, President Trump Cries ‘Fake
News,’ and the World Follows, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/fact-checker/wp/2018/02/06/president-trump-cries-fake-news-and-the-worldfollows/. For convenience’s sake, however, this Article uses the term in the sense described.
129. 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976).
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the Bill of Rights were designed to protect against precisely such
majoritarian limitations on individual liberty.”130
Along similar lines, for a plurality in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,
Justice Stevens upheld the authority of the FCC to fine a radio station for
broadcasting George Carlin’s non-obscene “Filthy Words” monologue in
the afternoon, partly to protect children and unwilling adults from tuning in
unwittingly.131 Not surprisingly, Justice Brennan in dissent decried the
public’s loss of the “free[dom] to choose those communications worthy of
its attention from a marketplace unsullied by the censor’s hand.”132
Finally, subsequent cases made it even easier for the government to
engage in “erogenous zoning”133 by treating asserted interests—such as
mitigating crime and protecting property values—as content neutral and,
therefore, subject only to intermediate scrutiny. A prime example of such
treatment is Renton v. Playtime Theatre, where the Rehnquist Court found a
zoning ordinance targeting adult movie theaters to be content neutral and
constitutional under intermediate scrutiny.134
The potential reductive impact of these cases on the right to receive
information and ideas, if not entirely eliminated, has at least been blunted
outside the context of physical zoning or broadcast media. Of particular
relevance to this Article, the Court recently has come to treat the regulation
of sexually explicit content in newer media as content based and therefore
presumptively invalid under the more speech-protective strict scrutiny test.
For instance, in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, the Court
invalidated a federal requirement that cable operators fully scramble or
block sexually oriented programming as a content-based restriction.135 The
requirement failed strict scrutiny because less restrictive alternatives would

130. Id. at 86.
131. 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 (1978).
132. Id. at 772. Justice Brennan’s constitutional preference for consumers—including
children—to choose which sexual information and ideas to accept or reject subsequently
prevailed in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983). Justice Marshall’s
majority opinion recognized not only the right of parents to “truthful information bearing on
their ability to discuss birth control and make informed decisions,” but also the “significant”
First Amendment right of minors to receive information. Id. at 74, 74 n.30; see also id. at 79
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (agreeing that a ban on mailing unsolicited advertisements for
contraceptives “den[ies] parents access to information about birth control that might help
them make informed decisions”).
133. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 934 (2d ed. 1988).
134. 475 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1986).
135. 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
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have left access to or blocking of such speech up to cable subscribers.136
Contradicting
the
“few-of-us-would-march-our-sons-and-daughters”
majoritarian justification in American Mini Theaters, and rejecting the
paternalism of Pacifica, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion observed that
“even with the mandate or approval of a majority,” the First Amendment
“exists precisely so that opinions and judgments, including esthetic and
moral judgments about art and literature,” are left “for the individual to
make.”137
Moreover, in Reno v. ACLU, Justice Stevens himself authored the
majority opinion limiting the applicability of Pacifica to the “particular
medium” of broadcasting, where “warnings could not adequately protect
the listener from unexpected program content.”138 Setting aside Pacifica,
the Court invalidated a federal ban on “indecent” and “patently offensive”
online materials accessible to minors partly on First Amendment
overbreadth grounds, concluding that the ban “effectively suppresses a
large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and
to address to one another.”139 And in Ashcroft v. ACLU, Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion applied Playboy to uphold a preliminary injunction against
a federal ban on sexually oriented commercial online postings “harmful to
minors.”140 The Court concluded that the regulation was likely to fail the
least restrictive alternative prong of strict scrutiny, as filtering software
might well be more effective at protecting children’s access to harmful
materials while allowing adults to “gain access to speech they have a right
to see.”141
2. Student Speech
In the landmark student speech case Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District, the Court upheld the First Amendment right of
students to wear armbands to protest the Vietnam War.142 Justice Fortas’s
majority opinion also recognized that the rights of other students to receive
the armband-wearing students’ speech were at stake, declaring, “In our

136. See id. at 818–26.
137. Id. at 818.
138. 521 U.S. 844, 867 (1997).
139. Id. at 874. Earlier, in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., Justice Stevens also embraced “[t]he
preservation of a full and free flow of information to the general public” as “a core objective
of the First Amendment.” 438 U.S. 1, 30 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. 542 U.S. 656, 661 (2004).
141. Id. at 667.
142. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only
that which the State chooses to communicate.”143 This right of students to
receive information and ideas was reaffirmed forcefully in Justice
Brennan’s plurality opinion in Board of Education, Island Trees Union
Free School District v. Pico.144 In the lengthiest discourse to date on the
right to receive information and ideas, Justice Brennan drew from cases
such as Martin, Griswold, Stanley, Mandel, and Lamont and authorities
ranging from Madison to Meiklejohn to demonstrate not only the
established nature of “the right to receive ideas” as “an inherent corollary of
the rights of free speech and press,”145 but also to ground the right in
theoretical principles of self-governance.146 Accordingly, his plurality
opinion held that school boards cannot remove books from their libraries
“simply because they dislike the ideas contained in those books,” as access
to unorthodox ideas “prepares students for active and effective participation
in a pluralistic society.”147
3. The Roberts Court
The Court’s increasing unwillingness to countenance limitations on
marketplace access to protected speech reflects a modern trend toward
greater speech protection that reaches new heights under the Roberts
Court.148 The burgeoning and generally speech-protective free speech
jurisprudence of the Roberts Court has fortified the right to receive
information and ideas in a number of potentially significant ways for
speech from abroad.
Citizens United and Bluman. Perhaps most consequentially, a majority of
the Roberts Court in Citizens United v. FEC declared, in sweeping terms,
that “the First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of political
speech based on the speaker’s identity,” as such restrictions are “all too
often simply a means to control content.”149 The Court applied what Justice
143. Id. at 511.
144. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
145. Id. at 867.
146. See infra notes 264–71 and accompanying text.
147. Pico, 457 U.S. at 868, 872.
148. As one prominent commentator put it, free speech claims have, “in the hands of the
current court, become an engine of deregulation.” Linda Greenhouse, An Indecent Burial,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/17/opinion/an-indecentburial.html; see also Joel M. Gora, Free Speech Matters: The Roberts Court and the First
Amendment, 25 BROOKLYN J.L. & POL’Y. 63, 64 (2016) (contending that the Roberts Court is
“the most speech-protective Supreme Court in memory”).
149. 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).
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Stevens denominated a “glittering generality”150 to invalidate federal bans
on corporate expenditures that support express advocacy or electioneering
communications related to a political candidate, holding that “the
Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s
corporate identity.”151
If the identity of the speaker cannot serve as a basis for suppressing
political speech, then foreign speakers would seem to benefit as much from
Citizens United’s categorical rule as corporate speakers. Indeed, the central
rationale supporting the rule reinforces this conclusion. In rejecting the
antidistortion rationale of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce—
which previously upheld corporate speech restrictions on the ground that
the aggregate wealth and other advantages of the corporate form give
corporations an outsized advantage in the marketplace of ideas unrelated to
the value of their speech152—the Court reasoned that Austin itself
“interferes with the ‘open marketplace’ of ideas protected by the First
Amendment” by “prevent[ing] voices and viewpoints from reaching the
public and advising voters.”153 Consequently, the majority concluded, when
the government restricts “where a person may get his or her information or
what distrusted source he or she may not hear,” it violates “the freedom to
think for ourselves” that the First Amendment protects.154
Because the corporate bans at issue were not targeted at foreign
corporations, the majority in Citizens United reserved the question whether
its sweeping prohibition on speaker-based restrictions of political speech
would extend to federal bans on contributions by foreign individuals or
associations.155 But in dissent, Justice Stevens argued that, “[i]f taken
seriously,” the majority’s categorical rule and sweeping rationale would
reach foreign speakers (including propagandists like Tokyo Rose during
World War II) as well as foreign-controlled corporations.156 He criticized
this outcome, observing that “[t]he notion that Congress might lack the
authority to distinguish foreigners from citizens” in regulating
electioneering communications within the country “would certainly have
150. Id. at 394 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 365 (majority opinion).
152. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
153. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 354 (quoting N.Y. State Bd. Of Elections v. Lopez
Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008)).
154. Id. at 355.
155. See id. at 362 (“We need not reach the question whether the Government has a
compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or associations from influencing our
Nation’s political process.”).
156. Id. at 424 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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surprised the Framers, whose obsession with foreign influence derived from
a fear that foreign powers and individuals had no basic investment in the
well-being of the country.”157
On the merits, there is much force to Justice Stevens’s dissent, including
his historical point about the Framers’ fear of foreign meddling in a
fledgling democracy.158 But the force of that historical argument does not
undermine his conclusion that the logical endpoint of the majority’s
decision is the preclusion of government regulation of campaign speech
based on the foreign identity of the speaker. Regulations barring foreign
speakers from sharing their “voices and viewpoints” with the public on
electoral matters would interfere with “the open marketplace of ideas” in
similar fashion to the corporate bans invalidated in Citizens United. Both
kinds of restrictions deny the public “information” from “distrusted
source[s]” by government fiat rather than listener choice, thereby limiting
the public’s “freedom to think for ourselves.”159 Furthermore, just as
corporations might “possess valuable expertise” in their areas, “leaving
them best equipped to point out errors or fallacies in speech of all sorts,
including the speech of candidates and elected officials,”160 so too might
foreign speakers possess specialized information and perspectives that
would help the public assess the foreign policy positions of candidates,
elected officials, and the country.
Of course, there is much in the majority’s simplistic and sanguine use of
the marketplace of ideas metaphor that is subject to criticism, which Justice
Stevens aptly leveled in his dissent.161 But the pertinent point here is that,
however unpersuasive, the majority relied on that marketplace metaphor to
support its categorical rule against speaker-based distinctions. As in prior
opinions recognizing and rationalizing the right to receive information and
ideas, Citizens United favored unrestricted access to information and
ideas—even from potentially dangerous or distrustful speakers—as
essential to “the rights of free thought”162 and “the freedom to think for

157. Id. at 424 n.51 (quoting Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 341, 393 n. 245 (2009)).
158. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (“No Person except a natural born Citizen, or
a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be
eligible to the Office of President.”).
159. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356.
160. Id. at 364.
161. See id. at 465–78 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 253–254 and
accompanying text.
162. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 560 n.3 (1969) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ourselves”163 that Stanley and Citizens United respectively characterized as
the ultimate right protected by the First Amendment.
Citizens United thus offers more than just reaffirmation of the right to
receive information and ideas. It adds substantive content to that right in the
form of a general prohibition on regulating political speech based on the
speaker’s identity.164 This constitutional command of speaker neutrality
bolsters earlier decisions such as Meyer and Lamont that denied the
government’s regulatory power to exclude information and ideas of foreign
origin because of the domestic audience’s overriding First Amendment
right to receive them.
Given the categorical language and broad reasoning of Citizens United, it
is perhaps susceptible to over-reading as further precedent for a right to
receive speech from abroad, including from foreign individuals,
associations, and states. But this reading is further supported by Justice
Scalia’s concurrence, in which he argued that, because the First
Amendment is “written in terms of ‘speech,’ not speakers,” it textually
“offers no foothold for excluding any category of speaker.”165 Election law
scholar Richard Hasen has also concluded that “it is difficult to see how any
of the arguments supporting a foreign spending limit could be squared with
the reasoning of the majority in Citizens United.”166
Yet a follow-up case does offer some cause for caution against overreading Citizens United. In Bluman v. FEC, two resident aliens challenged
the federal bans on campaign and political contributions by foreigners.167
They argued that those bans ran afoul of “the Court’s condemnation of
speaker-based restrictions on political speech” in Citizens United.168 A
three-judge district court ruled against them, relying on a line of preCitizens United cases upholding the exclusion of foreigners from “activities
‘intimately related to the process of democratic self-government,’” such as
voting, holding elective office, teaching in public schools, and serving as
police officers.169 As for Citizens United, the district court observed that the
163. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356.
164. Of course, the categorical solidity of that prohibition is subject to question, as
Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent. See id. at 420–21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 392–93 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
166. Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV.
581, 606 (2011).
167. See Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 282–83 (D.D.C. 2011).
168. Jurisdictional Statement at *7, Bluman v. FEC, No. 11-275 (U.S. Sept. 1, 2011),
2752011 WL 3919650.
169. Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 287 (quoting Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220
(1984)).
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majority had left the question open and opted to follow Justice Stevens’s
dissent as an “accurate indicator of where the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence stands on the question of foreign contributions and
expenditures.”170 Furthermore, the panel limited its ruling to the monetary
bans at issue, disclaiming any decision on “whether Congress could
prohibit foreign nationals from engaging in speech” apart from political
contributions and expenditures.171
On appeal, the Court unanimously upheld the district court ruling,
without any attempt at explanation, in a summary affirmance.172 Perhaps it
could not cobble together an explanation upon which the remaining Citizens
United dissenters173 and majority could agree. More pointedly, as Professor
Hasen has argued, the Court could only reconcile the reasoning of Citizens
United with the result in Bluman “through doctrinal incoherence.”174
Thus, in theory, Bluman’s summary affirmance may imply a limit to
Citizen United’s anti-discrimination rule for speakers. But as the district
court in Bluman was careful to observe, it at least remains an open question
after Citizens United whether the government may exclude from the
domestic marketplace of ideas the political speech of foreigners, as opposed
to their campaign contributions and expenditures. And given the Court’s
increasingly strong embrace of the open marketplace of ideas, culminating
in Citizens United, it hardly seems likely that question would be answered
in the affirmative.175
Sorrell and Zemel. In Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., the Court invalidated a
state law that prohibited pharmacies from selling or disclosing and banned
pharmaceutical companies from using physician-identifiable prescribing

170. Id. at 289.
171. Id. at 292.
172. See Bluman v. FEC, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012).
173. Justice Stevens, in the interim between Citizens United and Bluman, had retired. His
dissent in Citizens United, from which he read during the Court’s hand down of the decision,
was his last and longest dissent.
174. Hasen, supra note 166, at 610.
175. In his symposium essay, Professor Joshua Sellers makes the narrower claim that
lying by foreign nationals in expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate
remains proscribable even after Alvarez. See Joshua Sellers, Legislating Against Lying in
Campaigns and Elections, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 141, 157 (2018) (“[I]f foreign nationals are
prohibited from making contributions and expenditures—rights that, especially in the case of
expenditures, have enjoyed substantial constitutional protection—it naturally follows that
their right to engage in intentionally false speech expressly advocating for or against the
election of a candidate may be similarly regulated.”).
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records for marketing purposes.176 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
observed that, because “facts” are “the beginning point” for much speech,
“[t]here is . . . a strong argument that prescriber-identifying information is
speech for First Amendment purposes.”177 In any case, because the law
“imposes a speaker- and content-based burden on protected expression”
against marketers and marketing, respectively, the Court deemed
“heightened scrutiny” appropriate.178
Sorrell bolstered the right to receive information and ideas in two ways.
Most obviously, it reaffirmed Citizens United’s general rule against
speaker-based restrictions as a backdoor for content-based censorship of
disfavored ideas.179 More importantly, though, it added another potential
dimension to the right to receive information and ideas, suggesting an
extension to “the beginning point” of the formation of speech—that is, the
acquisition of information on which speech is based.180
This contrasts somewhat with the Court’s apparent rejection of a claim of
information-gathering as speech half a century earlier in Zemel v. Rusk.181
In Zemel, the Court dismissed the contention that the State Department’s
refusal to validate a passport for travel to Cuba—to make the traveler “a
better informed citizen”—implicated the First Amendment, as the travel
embargo was “an inhibition of action” rather than speech.182 But restrictions
on conduct can incidentally burden speech and give rise to First
Amendment claims,183 so the conclusion that the travel embargo regulated
conduct did not preclude the traveler from raising a valid free speech claim.
Perhaps recognizing this, the Court alternatively declared that “[t]he right to
speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather
information.”184
Significantly, while this statement in Zemel may appear to reject the
claim that information-gathering is a First Amendment protected activity, it
actually acknowledges the possibility of such a claim in denying that the
176. See 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011).
177. Id. at 570.
178. Id. at 571. The Court did not find it necessary to determine whether strict scrutiny
was appropriate, as is generally the case for content- and speaker-based restrictions, or
whether the intermediate scrutiny test for commercial speech was appropriate, because it
determined that the state law would fail both. See id.
179. See id. at 580.
180. See id. at 570.
181. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
182. Id. at 4, 16.
183. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
184. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 17.
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right is “unrestrained.”185 Sorrell all but confirms that acknowledgement in
recognizing the “strong argument” that information gathering of prescriber
practices “is speech for First Amendment purposes.”186 And a direct
endorsement of information gathering as a protected First Amendment
activity would strengthen the claim that gathering facts and opinions from
other speakers, including foreign nationals and nations, is protected by the
First Amendment as well.
Entertainment Merchants and Stevens. Another potentially significant
precedent from the Roberts Court’s speech-protective portfolio is Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, which struck down a state ban on the sale
of violent video games to minors.187 Most notably—and vividly, given
Justice Scalia’s authorship—the Court endorsed the principle that all
protected speech, regardless of its cultural and intellectual worth, is subject
to the same First Amendment standards, including strict scrutiny for
content-based restrictions:
Reading Dante is unquestionably more cultured and
intellectually edifying than playing Mortal Kombat. But these
cultural and intellectual differences are not constitutional ones.
Crudely violent video games, tawdry TV shows, and cheap
novels and magazines are no less forms of speech than The
Divine Comedy, and restrictions upon them must survive strict
scrutiny . . . .188
That First Amendment protection generally does not depend on the
social value of the speech is, of course, a point made in many previous
cases, including Stanley.189 But the Roberts Court’s forceful reaffirmation
of that point is nonetheless significant—especially when applied to speech,
like extremely violent video games, that puts the point to the test.
Another recent test case was United States v. Stevens, which invalidated
a federal ban targeting fetishistic depictions of animal cruelty known as
185. Which, of course, no constitutional right, including any First Amendment right, is.
See supra note 80 and accompanying text. For further examination of the nature and limits
of information-gathering as a First Amendment right, particularly in light of Zemel, see
Blitz, supra note 44, at 89–91, 102–03.
186. See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570 (2011).
187. 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
188. Id. at 796 n.4. The majority’s recognition that minors have a right of access to
speech that concededly may be of very little social worth extends the “significant” First
Amendment protection that children possess, as recognized by the Court in Bolger. See
supra note 132.
189. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
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“crush videos.”190 Rejecting as “startling and dangerous” the proposition
that “an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits” might serve
as “a general precondition” for protecting speech that does not fall into a
historically unprotected category, Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion
noted that “[m]ost of what we say to one another . . . lacks value . . . but it is
still sheltered from Government regulation.”191
Of course, statements like these are scattered throughout the U.S.
Reports.192 But these reaffirmations are particularly significant for a number
of reasons. First, the simple fact of the Roberts Court reaffirming these
statements confirms their continuing vitality. Second, the strength of their
reaffirmation puts them on the same categorical plane as Citizens United’s
rule against speaker-based restrictions.
Indeed, Citizens United, Entertainment Merchants, and Stevens together
present a formidable pair of rules that fortify the right to receive
information and ideas on two fronts—one barring the denial of marketplace
access based on the identity of the speaker, the other barring the denial of
marketplace access based on the value of the speech. Neither these
categorical rules nor their marketplace rationales easily yield to an
exception. If the protection of violent video games and crush videos are as
essential for people “to think for ourselves” as corporate electioneering
communications,193 then it is difficult to see why information and ideas
from abroad, whether from foreign individuals or even hostile foreign
nations, are not either. Finally, on top of Playboy, Reno, and Ashcroft, the
unhesitating and unstinting application of First Amendment principles to
relatively new expressive media such as video games leaves no doubt that
the right to receive information and ideas extends to wherever speakers and
listeners may find each other, including online platforms and social
networks.194

190. 559 U.S. 460, 465–66, 482 (2010).
191. Id. at 470, 479.
192. For example, Chief Justice Roberts quoted Justice Harlan’s majority opinion in
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 479–80 (“Even ‘[w]holly
neutral futilities . . . come under the protection of free speech as fully as do Keats’ poems or
Donne’s sermons.” (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted))).
And Justice Scalia reached back over half a century to (re)make the point that even if certain
expressive materials have “‘nothing of any possible value to society . . . , they are as much
entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature.’” Entertainment Merchs.
Ass’n, 564 U.S. at 796–97 n.4 (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)).
193. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 356 (2010).
194. See infra Section III.D.
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Alvarez. Whether the government may regulate fake news and other
falsehoods from abroad will partly turn on United States v. Alvarez.195 In
that case, an elected member of a local water district board falsely boasted
that he had received the Congressional Medal of Honor for acts of valor as
a marine.196 That lie was a crime under the Stolen Valor Act, a federal law
that banned lying about receiving congressional military honors.197
A diverse plurality of the Court, led by Justice Kennedy and joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, invalidated the
law on First Amendment grounds.198 In a familiar pattern for the Roberts
Court, the plurality dismissed any possibility that lying about military
honors should be considered unprotected speech pursuant to a balancing of
the social costs and benefits of the speech.199 As in Stevens and
Entertainment Merchants, the plurality firmly limited that balancing
approach to justifying “historic and traditional categories” of unprotected
speech.200
In addition, the plurality rejected the government’s broader argument
that the Court has traditionally treated false speech as lacking in value and
First Amendment protection.201 While acknowledging that certain kinds of
false statements, such as defamation, fraud, and perjury, fall outside of the
First Amendment, the plurality confined unprotected falsehoods to
statements that cause some “legally cognizable harm” apart from the
potential of all falsehoods to interfere with “the truth-seeking function of
the marketplace of ideas.”202 For example, defamation damages reputation,
fraud inflicts financial harm, and perjury undermines the integrity of the
judicial system.203
The plurality declined to endorse the government’s proposed
“categorical rule” that “false statements receive no First Amendment
protection.”204 If “the interest in truthful discourse alone is sufficient to
sustain a ban on speech,” the plurality warned, then the government “could
compile a list of subjects about which false statements are punishable” with
195. 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
196. Id. at 713.
197. Id. at 714.
198. Id. at 715.
199. See id. at 717.
200. Id. (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
201. See id. at 718.
202. Id. at 718–19 (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988)).
203. See id. at 719–21.
204. Id. at 719.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss1/10

2018]

THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE FOREIGN SPEECH

303

“no clear limiting principle.”205 Instead of “Oceania’s Ministry of Truth,”
the plurality endorsed the familiar First Amendment refrain that “[t]he
remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true.”206 For military honors,
the remedy could take the form of online databases to verify claims and
expose false ones.207 Quoting Justice Holmes, the plurality concluded that
this “competition of the market” would be “the best test of truth,” consistent
with “[t]he theory of our Constitution.”208
Justice Breyer, concurring in the judgment with Justice Kagan, distanced
himself from the “strict categorical analysis” of the plurality.209 Instead, he
favored an ad-hoc “proportionality review” that neither results in “nearautomatic condemnation” nor “near-automatic approval,” and that he
equated with “what the Court has termed ‘intermediate scrutiny.’”210 As he
further explained, this approach asks “whether the statute works speechrelated harm that is out of proportion to its justifications,” as well as
“whether there are other, less restrictive ways” of achieving the
government’s objectives.211
Applying his approach, Justice Breyer accepted that the statute had a
“substantial justification” in protecting military honors from dilution, but
concluded that “a more finely tailored statute” that “insist[s] upon a
showing that the false statement caused specific harm” or “focus[es] its
coverage on lies most likely to be harmful,” would be more proportionate
and consistent with narrower common law and statutory instances in which
falsehoods have been outlawed.212 He distinguished the law at issue from
“[l]aws restricting false statements about philosophy, religion, history, the
social sciences, the arts, and the like,” which have triggered strict scrutiny
because of “[t]he dangers of suppressing valuable ideas.”213 And, of
particular relevance here, Justice Breyer cautioned:
In the political arena a false statement is more likely to make a
behavioral difference (say, by leading the listeners to vote for the
205. Id. at 723.
206. Id. at 723, 727.
207. Id. at 729.
208. Id. at 728 (plurality) (“The theory of our Constitution is ‘that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the marketplace.’”
(quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
209. Id. at 730 (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
210. Id. at 730–32 (internal quotation marks omitted).
211. Id. at 730.
212. Id. at 734, 737–38.
213. Id. at 731–32.
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speaker), but at the same time criminal prosecution is
particularly dangerous (say, by radically changing a potential
election result) and consequently can more easily result in
censorship of speakers and their ideas. Thus, the statute may
have to be significantly narrowed in its applications.214
Justice Breyer’s concurrence thus left open the possibility of
“significantly” narrow regulations of false political speech, including fake
news and other misleading speech from abroad, to prevent the public in
general and voters in particular from being misled. At the same time, his
concurrence made clear that the needle would—and should—be especially
difficult to thread given the risk of censorship. This possibility and its
qualifications are especially significant given that his and Justice Kagan’s
less categorical views tipped the outcome of the case.
Justice Alito’s dissent, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, also bears
on the constitutionality of any proposal to regulate false or misleading
speech. The dissenters’ take on the constitutional status of falsehoods was
the categorical inverse of the plurality’s—“false factual statements possess
no intrinsic First Amendment value” and “merit no First Amendment
protection in their own right.”215 Rather, some false statements warrant “a
measure of strategic protection” where necessary “to prevent the chilling of
other, valuable speech,” such as in the context of defamation of public
officials or figures.216
However, in apparent agreement with both the plurality and the
concurrence—making for a unanimous Court—the dissenters qualified that
“there are broad areas in which any attempt by the state to penalize
purportedly false speech would present a grave and unacceptable danger of
suppressing truthful speech.”217 Those areas include “philosophy, religion,
history, the social sciences, the arts, and other matters of public concern,”
where the state might very well proscribe falsehoods “for political ends.”218
Given this caveat—and, importantly, given its consistency with the
categorical views of the plurality and more qualified views of the
concurrence—it appears that a wide majority, if not the entirety, of the
Roberts Court would strike down regulations on false political speech given
the intolerable risk of government bias and meddling in this quintessential
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 738.
Id. at 746, 748–49.
Id. at 750, 751 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974)).
Id. at 751.
Id. at 751, 752.
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sector of the marketplace of ideas.219 Consequently, as Professor Joshua
Sellers observes in his contribution to this symposium issue, Alvarez also
“clearly renders laws regulating false campaign and election speech
constitutionally suspect.”220
In sum, the Court in recent decades has fortified the right to receive
information and ideas in a variety of contexts, adding breadth and vitality to
that right. Perhaps most consequentially, the Court in Citizens United v.
FEC generally forbade regulating speech on the basis of the identity of the
speaker, and its categorical rule and far-reaching rationale inescapably
extend to all manner of foreign speakers. Additionally, in Sorrell v. IMS
Health, Inc., the Court broadly recognized that information gathering is
entitled to First Amendment protection as a predicate to speech. Together,
these cases fortify the right of domestic listeners to gather information and
ideas from speakers regardless of their nationality or locality. Furthermore,
Entertainment Merchants and Stevens augment Citizens United’s
categorical ban on speaker-based discrimination with their bar against
restrictions based on the asserted lack of social value of certain expressive
materials that fall outside the historically unprotected categories of speech.
These cases could hinder the government from justifying on social value
grounds any attempt to block false or misleading foreign speech from
entering the domestic marketplace. Finally, in Alvarez, an otherwisesplintered Roberts Court united to express skepticism about the ability of
the government to regulate false political speech, with a wide majority
appearing to rule it out. Considered together, these decisions likely preclude
the government from barring the entry of political speech from abroad on
the ground that the speaker is foreign or that the speech is valueless or
false—not because foreign speakers abroad have a First Amendment right
to speak, but because the First Amendment demands an open marketplace
of ideas for domestic listeners.

219. For further discussion of the impact of Alvarez on the First Amendment status of
falsehoods, see Sellers, supra note 175, at 146-49; Erwin Chemerinsky, False Speech and
the First Amendment, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2018); Jonathan D. Varat, Truth, Courage,
and Other Human Dispositions: Reflections on Falsehoods and the First Amendment, 71
OKLA. L. REV. 35, 39-47 (2018).
220. Sellers, supra note 175, at 149 n.52 (citing Richard L. Hasen, A Constitutional Right
to Lie in Campaigns and Elections, 74 MONT. L. REV. 53, 56 (2013) (“The result of Alvarez
is that laws regulating false campaign speech are in even more constitutional trouble than
they were before, and any attempts to regulate such speech will have to be narrow, targeted,
and careful in their choice of remedies.”)).
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D. Receiving Foreign Information and Ideas Online
The rise of online media platforms, particularly social networks, as the
primary channels for the dissemination of speech worldwide has
mitigated—if not rendered obsolete—the traditional sovereign authority
upheld by the Court in previous decades to deny physical entry to certain
expressive materials and speakers from abroad. And, building on the
Court’s earlier online speech opinions in Reno v. ACLU and Ashcroft v.
ACLU,221 a majority of the Roberts Court at least appears ready to protect
access to information and ideas online, including from abroad, to the same,
robust extent as speech in traditional public forums.
While the federal government has stepped up searches of electronic
devices belonging to travelers entering at the border222 and expanded its
screening of visa applicants to include their social media activities,223 it has
not yet attempted to screen and block online speech from abroad. Whether
this regulatory inaction arises from the technical and pragmatic difficulties
inherent in filtering online content from abroad,224 or whether legal or
political considerations have kept the United States from joining other
regimes that attempt to control the cross-border flow of information,225 the
federal government at present focuses its enforcement efforts on domestic
recipients and distributors of proscribed speech.226 Consequently, as
Professor Timothy Zick has concluded, “the digitization of speech has
fundamentally altered the scope of the First Amendment by reducing
governmental power to bar information and ideas at the nation’s territorial
borders.”227 On the worldwide web, in other words, the marketplace of
ideas has become “unalterably de-territorialized.”228
221. See supra notes 138–141 and accompanying text.
222. See Ron Nixon, Cellphone and Computer Searches at U.S. Border Rise Under
Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/05/us/politics/trumpborder-search-cellphone-computer.html.
223. See Yeganeh Torbati, Trump Administration Approves Tougher Visa Vetting,
Including Social Media Checks, REUTERS (May 31, 2017, 6:58 PM), https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-usa-immigration-visa/trump-administration-approves-tougher-visa-vettingincluding-social-media-checks-idUSKBN18R3F8.
224. See Zick, supra note 30, at 1603 (“It is one thing to prevent the entry of harmful
persons, packages, and other tangible materials into the United States. It is quite another to
stop bits and bytes at territorial borders.”).
225. See Key Internet Controls By Country, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/
report/key-internet-controls-table-2017 (last visited May 31, 2018).
226. See Zick, supra note 30, at 1605.
227. Id. at 1606.
228. Id.
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The truth of this claim is apparent to anyone in the United States with an
internet connection. Content from abroad is a simple click, tap, or swipe
away; moreover, such content is often commingled with domestic content
without distinction. It has never been so easy to receive so much
information and so many ideas from so many sources, both foreign and
domestic.
But on the flip side, as various investigations are uncovering, it has also
never been so easy for foreign speakers—including hostile foreign
powers—to exploit this open marketplace of ideas maliciously to
disseminate misinformation.229 In particular, the 2016 presidential election
cycle vividly illustrates how popular social networks such as Facebook and
Twitter, with the voluntary clustering of politically likeminded individuals
and the application of sophisticated ad targeting, can greatly amplify the
reach—if not also the effectiveness—of a sensational story from a foreign
speaker seeking to influence the domestic political marketplace.
There is no doubt that a majority of the current Court views this open
online marketplace as a vital forum for speech, and that the ease of access
to information and ideas from abroad is generally regarded as a virtue rather
than a vice. Just this past term, in Packingham v. North Carolina, the Court
through Justice Kennedy extolled “the ‘vast democratic forums of the
Internet.’”230 Moreover, the Court singled out social media for its
“relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communications of all
kinds,”231 and Facebook in particular for facilitating speech among a
worldwide user base “three times the population of North America.”232
Because of the “vast potential” for the online marketplace of ideas to “alter
how we think, express ourselves, and define who we want to be,” the Court
cautioned against any suggestion that the First Amendment should not
vigorously protect “access to vast networks in that medium.”233
Accordingly, the Court struck down a state statute that barred registered
sex offenders from accessing social networks and other websites where they
may contact minors.234 Assessed against the state’s interest in protecting
minors online from sex offenders, the Court found the statute fell far short
of narrow tailoring even under the assumption that it was content neutral
and subject to the less demanding means-ends fit of intermediate
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text.
137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997)).
Id. (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 870)).
Id.
Id. at 1736.
See id. at 1734–35.
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scrutiny.235 The state could not “bar[] access to what for many are the
principle sources for knowing current events . . . speaking and listening in
the modern public square, and otherwise exploring the vast realms of
human thought and knowledge.”236 This and similar language in Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion237 not only come off as paeans to the internet
as a modern speech forum “of historic proportions,”238 but also as
expressions of the importance of protecting the right to receive information
and ideas in its “vast realms.”239
It was precisely this “loose rhetoric” comparing the internet to traditional
public forums that “troubled” Justice Alito, who along with the Chief
Justice and Justice Thomas only concurred in the judgment.240 Though
agreeing with the majority that the law was not narrowly tailored,241 Justice
Alito’s opinion criticized the Court for failing to “be cautious in applying
our free speech precedents to the internet” given “important differences
between cyberspace and the physical world.”242 According to Justice Alito,
differences relevant to the statutory context at issue included “[the]
unprecedented degree of anonymity” online that “easily permits” speakers
to “assume a false identity.”243
In sum, unfiltered domestic access to the internet has made foreign
information and ideas available in “historic proportions.”244 Any attempt at
limiting such access would run up against the Packingham majority’s

235. Id. at 1736.
236. Id. at 1737.
237. See, e.g., id. at 1738 (concluding that the state “may not enact this complete bar to
the exercise of First Amendment rights on websites integral to the fabric of our modern
society and culture”).
238. Id. at 1736.
239. Id. at 1737. These sentiments in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion echo those of
Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court in Reno, at the advent of widespread public internet
usage, that “[t]he Internet is a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human
communication” in which “tens of millions” can communicate and access “vast amounts of
information from around the world.” Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997).
240. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738. Justice Gorsuch did not join the Court in time to
participate in the decision. Id.
241. Id. at 1741 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The fatal problem for [the law] is that its wide
sweep precludes access to a large number of websites that are most unlikely to facilitate the
commission of a sex crime against a child.”).
242. Id. at 1743.
243. Id. at 1743–44.
244. Id. at 1736.
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strongly worded warnings against restricting the internet’s “vast democratic
forums” for “speaking and listening.”245
IV. Foreign Speech and First Amendment Functions
Given the exploitation of our online marketplace of ideas by foreign
individuals affiliated with the Russian government to sway the 2016
election and sow social discord with sensational and false speech, it is
essential to consider whether this current state of affairs is consistent not
only with case law, but moreover with the primary functions of the First
Amendment. Three functions are commonly cited as underlying the First
Amendment: facilitating the search for truth, promoting democratic selfgovernance, and furthering self-realization.246
Truth-seeking. It seems safe to conclude that unfettered access to foreign
speech that is truthful facilitates the oft-cited marketplace function of
sorting truth from falsehood.247 Listeners exposed to truthful speech gain
the opportunity to weigh it against false speech and decide for themselves
which to accept. For example, data, studies, and other speech from abroad
on the existence of and threats posed by climate change, including from
foreign scientists and organizations,248 offer counterpoints to the domestic
suppression or denial of such empirical facts and scientific consensus.249 At
best, the truths from abroad are adopted. At worse, they are not, but at least
remain available for reconsideration. The search for truth is thereby either
advanced or at least not made any worse off.
On matters where truth is not settled or on matters of opinion, it also is
advantageous, if not imperative, to truth-seeking to protect access to
information and ideas from every interested speaker, including both friends
and foes. For instance, suppose the President makes a case for war against a
foreign nation based on an unproven assertion that it is illegally harboring
weapons of mass destruction.250 Before American lives and resources are
245. Id. at 1735, 1737 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 621 U.S. 844, 868 (1997)).
246. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 5–9 (6th
ed. 2016); Marceau & Chen, supra note 44, at 999; Zick, supra note 30, at 1593.
247. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
248. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FIFTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT (2013–2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/.
249. See, e.g., Sarah Sax, See How Trump Is Hiding Climate Change, VICE NEWS (Jan.
11, 2018), https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/gywmx3/before-and-after-images-show-howtrump-is-hiding-climate-change.
250. Cf. Text: Bush’s Speech on Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2003), http://www.nytimes.
com/2003/03/18/politics/text-bushs-speech-on-iraq.html.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

310

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:269

committed, it would seem crucial for the public to hear what other world
leaders—not least the one against whose nation war is threatened—might
have to say with respect to the truth of those accusations or the desirability
of the threatened conflict. Even if “the competition of the marketplace”
does not operate swiftly enough for the public to accurately assess the
asserted basis for going to war or the wisdom of it,251 at least such
competition would allow the public to make a more informed judgment.
Thus, unfiltered access to counter-speech from abroad seems essential,
particularly in the foreign policy context, where the full array of facts and
perspectives on international disputes may not otherwise be advanced by
domestic leaders.
When an adversary as resourceful and sophisticated as Russia broadly
disseminates speech weaponized to deceive,252 the truth-facilitating function
of access to foreign information and ideas might be difficult to perceive.
One might theoretically propound that marketplace competition is “the best
test of truth”253 and that, when “[Truth] and Falsehood grapple; who ever
knew Truth put to the [worse], in a free and open encounter?”254 But as the
nation’s experience with Russia’s extensive disinformation campaign
during the 2016 election has illustrated, falsehoods may not be exposed and
truths may not emerge until well after voters leave the ballot booth.255 As
one scholar has observed, “In the long run, true ideas do tend to drive out
false ones,” but “the short run may be very long.”256
Moreover, “[t]he remedy for speech that is false”257 may not reach the
highly polarized echo chambers of social media and news coverage
consumed by millions of Americans.258 Indeed, a recent study by the
European Research Council concluded “that fact-checking largely failed to
effectively reach consumers of fake news” on Facebook, which the study
251. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 7–25 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
254. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 35 (Percy Lund, Humphries & Co. Ltd. 1927) (1644).
But see Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1641, 1641 (1967) (arguing that “a self-operating marketplace of ideas . . . has long
ceased to exist” because of concentrated ownership and control of “the media of mass
communications”).
255. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
256. Harry H. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1130 (1979).
257. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727 (2012).
258. See Roheeni Saxena, The Social Media “Echo Chamber” Is Real, ARS TECHNICA
(Mar. 13, 2017, 1:25 PM), https://arstechnica.com/science/2017/03/the-social-media-echochamber-is-real/.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss1/10

2018]

THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE FOREIGN SPEECH

311

also found to be “the most important mechanism facilitating [its] spread.”259
That study also found, however, that the most avid fake news consumers
generally were the highest consumers of traditional news,260 and another
study found that most Americans do not turn to social media as their “most
important” source of news.261
Because of the unprecedented nature of the spread of fake news during
the 2016 election, further study is needed on how it affects consumers and
the marketplace at large.262 While “the clearer perception and livelier
impression of truth” may in theory be “produced by its collision with
error,”263 it is impossible to say at present whether, as an empirical matter,
unrestricted access to false and misleading foreign speech ultimately tends
to further, frustrate, or not affect the truth-seeking function of the First
Amendment.
Self-governance. Closely related to the truth-seeking function of the First
Amendment is its promotion of democratic discussion and decisionmaking. As Justice Harlan articulated in Cohen v. California, the First
Amendment
is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from
the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what
views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the
hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more
capable citizenry and more perfect polity.264
For the public to be better informed, debate on public issues needs to be
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” which in turn is facilitated by access
to information and ideas beyond those curated by government officials.265
259. Guess et al., supra note 9, at 2.
260. See id. at S24.
261. Allcott & Gentzkow, supra note 22, at 212 (internal quotation marks omitted).
262. See Guess et al., supra note 9, at 11–12; Allcott & Gentzkow, supra note 22, at 232.
263. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 25 (Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1859).
264. 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (arguing that the Founders “believed that freedom to think as you
will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of
political truth”); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 63 (1948) (arguing for greater protection of “public” speech than “private”
speech because of its promotion of “self-government”). But see Zechariah Chafee Jr., Book
Review, Free Speech: And Its Relation to Self-Government, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891 (1949)
(criticizing Meiklejohn’s conception of the First Amendment as too narrow and not
protective of art and literature).
265. Abernathy v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also Letter from James
Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard
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Indeed, on foreign policy matters and other global issues, it seems
indisputable generally that input from abroad benefits public understanding,
discussion, and decision-making by supplying the public with a wider set of
facts and views to consider, including those that domestic leaders may not
wish to publicize. In addition to the example of climate change, consider
the increasingly threatening exchanges between President Trump and Kim
Jong Un last fall.266 Without knowledge of how North Korea’s leader
responded, not to mention the reactions of other world leaders, it would
have been difficult if not impossible for the public to assess the President’s
words and policies toward the hostile nuclear state. So in our interconnected
times, open access to information and ideas from abroad seems essential for
self-governance at home, including in the context of electoral campaigns,
where foreign policy can take center stage.267
As with truth-seeking, whether unrestricted access to fake news and
other falsehoods from abroad improves public discussion and decisionmaking is a more difficult question. Again, the answer is affirmative if the
marketplace functions efficiently and effectively in sorting truths from
falsehoods.268 But that is a big “if” requiring further empirical study with
respect to the marketplace effects of a massive misinformation campaign
such as Russia’s in 2016.269 It may turn out that such sizable and
sophisticated operations by foreign states do cloud public debate and
adversely affect democratic decision making, and, furthermore, that
suppressing such disinformation operations by state actors would not chill
other valuable speech from home or abroad.270 If so, then perhaps some

Hunt ed., 1910) (“A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of
acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both.”).
266. See Peter Baker & Rick Gladstone, With Combative Style and Epithets, Trump
Takes America First to the U.N., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/09/19/world/trump-un-north-korea-iran.html (reporting on President Trump’s U.N.
address, in which he vowed to “totally destroy North Korea” if it threatens the United
States); Full Text of Kim Jong-un’s Response to President Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/22/world/asia/kim-jong-un-trump.html (responding that North Korea “will consider with seriousness exercising of a corresponding, highest
level of hard-line countermeasure in history”).
267. See Joshua Berlinger, Nukes, Terrorists and Hackers: Trump and Clinton Debate
Global Threats, CNN (Sept. 27, 2016), https://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/27/politics/presi
dential-debate-global-topics/index.html.
268. See supra notes 253–63 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 22-23, 262 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
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speaker-based disclosures at the nation-state level may be justified in
principle to protect democratic self-governance, as proposed in Part V.271
Self-realization. The First Amendment is also recognized as furthering
self-development and fulfillment—the freedom of speech “make[s] men
free to develop their faculties,”272 enables each individual to “realize[] his
or her full potential,”273 and protects against “[the] denial of autonomy . . .
over [an individual’s] own reasoning.”274 Allowing unfiltered access to
foreign information and ideas, including calculated and coordinated
falsehoods by hostile foreign states, seems entirely consistent with this First
Amendment function.275
If individuals prefer news and other speech from abroad that align with
their political or social leanings—and studies suggests that is generally
so276—then government restrictions should not stand in the way of
“what . . . [they] may read or what . . . [they] may watch” as matters of
personal choice.277 Even if personal development may be shaped by
individuals’ choices of what to consume from abroad, the First Amendment
affords them those choices, for good or ill.278 To be sure, the freedom to
further one’s development through the consumption of the speech of one’s
choosing should end where it denies the autonomy of another.279 But mere
271. See, e.g., infra notes 303–314 and accompanying text.
272. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).
273. Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
274. David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 334, 354 (1991); see also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649 (1968)
(Stewart, J., concurring in result) (stating that the First Amendment “secures as well the
liberty of each man to decide for himself what he will read and to what he will listen . . . . in
short, a society of free choice”); supra note 233 and accompanying text. But see Robert H.
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 25 (1971)
(arguing that self-realization as a free speech principle is too broad and “indistinguishable
from the functions or benefits of all other human activity”).
275. See REDISH, supra note 43, at 47.
276. See Allcott & Gentzkow, supra note 22, at 212; Guess et al., supra note 9, at 1.
277. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
278. See id. (“Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving
government the power to control men’s minds.”); cf. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564
U.S. 786, 794 n.4 (2011) (“Reading Dante is unquestionably more cultured and intellectually
edifying than playing Mortal Kombat. But these cultural and intellectual differences are not
constitutional ones.”).
279. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109 (1990) (holding that in-home
possession of child pornography is not protected by First Amendment because of
“compelling” state interest in “safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a
minor,” and distinguishing Stanley on the ground that the primary state concern in Stanley
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concern that access to foreign falsehoods may “poison the mind”280 does
not suffice to overcome the autonomy principle that some Justices and
scholars find in the First Amendment.
In sum, open access to foreign information and ideas seems generally
consistent with the commonly identified functions of the First Amendment
to further truth-seeking, democratic self-governance, and self-realization.
The difficult case of a large-scale, sophisticated misinformation campaign
by a hostile foreign power requires further empirical study to determine
whether, to what extent, and in what ways the truth-seeking and
democracy-promoting functions of the First Amendment may be
undermined.
V. Policy Responses and Recommendations
In response to the continuing threat that fake news and foreign meddling
in the marketplace of ideas may undercut democratic governance and
influence elections, a number of industry and government responses have
been advanced.
Evolving Responses. Out of political pressure281 if not also out of a sense
of social responsibility,282 Facebook, Twitter, Google, and other major
online platforms have begun making various changes to their platforms to
combat fake news.283 As the platform responsible for the most
dissemination of fake news,284 Facebook’s evolving playbook illustrates the
technological and policy challenges in effectively identifying and
remedying that kind of misinformation.
was that obscenity would “poison the mind of its viewers” (quoting New York v. Ferber,
485 U.S. 747, 756–58 (1982))).
280. See id.
281. See Cecelia Kang et al., Tech Executives Are Contrite About Election Meddling, but
Make Few Promises on Capitol Hill, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/10/31/us/politics/facebook-twitter-google-hearings-congress.html.
282. See, e.g., Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (Jan. 4, 2018, 9:40 AM), https://www.
facebook.com/zuck/posts/10104380170714571.
283. See, e.g., Elizabeth Dwoskin, Twitter Is Looking for Ways to Let Users Flag Fake
News, Offensive Content, WASH. POST (June 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-switch/wp/2017/06/29/twitter-is-looking-for-ways-to-let-users-flag-fake-news/;
Seith Fiegerman, Facebook, Google, Twitter to Fight Fake News with ‘Trust Indicators,’
CNN (Nov. 16, 2017, 3:35 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/11/16/technology/tech-trustindicators/index.html; Nick Wingfield et al., Google and Facebook Take Aim at Fake News
Sites, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/technology/google
-will-ban-websites-that-host-fake-news-from-using-its-ad-service.html.
284. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
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In December 2016, Facebook partnered with independent fact-checking
organizations to flag fake news articles for users.285 After a year of trial,
however, Facebook found that the flags did not clearly or sufficiently
convey the reasons for disputing the article, that they could sometimes
backfire and further entrench a user’s beliefs, and that the process took too
long given the massive amount of potentially fake news on its platform. 286
Instead, Facebook began surfacing fact-checked related articles next to
disputed ones, and found that although the “click-through rates” for the fake
news articles did not meaningfully decline, the rate of sharing such articles
did.287 Along with other major online platforms, Facebook has also purged
fake accounts and added “trust indicators” to news articles, where users can
find information uploaded by publishers about their publication, ownership
structure, and fact-checking, corrections, and ethics policies.288 Most
recently, Facebook has announced that it will crowdsource the trust
rankings of news sources to its immense userbase, characterizing this
approach as the “most objective” while confessing that it was not
“comfortable” taking on the role itself.289 Critics swiftly condemned this
new approach, however, as “the path of least responsibility for
Facebook”290 and one that could further entrench the political echo
chambers on its platform.291
285. See Jeff Smith et al., Designing Against Misinformation: Facebook Design, MEDIUM
(Dec. 20, 2017), https://medium.com/facebook-design/designing-against-misinformatione5846b3aa1e2.
286. See id.
287. See id.; see also Thuy Ong, Facebook Found a Better Way to Fight Fake News,
VERGE (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/12/21/16804912/facebookdisputed-flags-misinformation-newsfeed-fake-news.
288. See Casey Newton, Facebook Adds Trust Indicators to News Articles in an Effort to
Identify Real Journalism, VERGE (Nov. 16, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/
2017/11/16/16658538/facebook-trust-indicators-fake-news-trust-project; Shane, supra note
15.
289. Elizabeth Dwoskin & Hamza Shaban, Facebook Will Now Ask Users to Rank News
Organizations They Trust, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/01/19/facebook-will-now-ask-its-users-to-rank-news-organi
zations-they-trust/?hpid=hp_hp-more-top-stories_facebook-410pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory.
290. Nitasha Tiku, Facebook’s Latest Fix for Fake News: Ask Users What They Trust,
WIRED (Jan. 19, 2018, 8:39 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/facebooks-latest-fix-forfake-news-ask-users-what-they-trust/ (internal quotation marks omitted).
291. See Scott Clement & Callum Borchers, Facebook Plans to Crowdsource Media
Credibility. This Chart Shows Why That Will Be So Difficult, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/01/24/facebook-plans-to-crowd
source-media-credibility-this-chart-shows-why-that-will-be-so-difficult/?hpid=hp_hp-cards
_hp-card-technology%3Ahomepage%2Fcard.
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Policymakers also have advanced proposals for fighting fake news. For
example, at the state level, California legislators have proposed two starkly
different approaches. The first proposal would have broadly banned any
“false or deceptive statement designed to influence the vote” on “[a]ny
issue” or “[a]ny candidate,” but this proposal was withdrawn after
withering criticism over its breadth.292 The second proposal mirrors
measures in other states calling for the creation of a K-12 curriculum in
“media literacy” that would teach students to consume media critically and
to differentiate between real and fake news.293 On the federal level, one bill,
co-sponsored by Senators Amy Klobuchar, John McCain, and Mark
Warner, would require disclosure of the purchaser of online political ads.294
Another bill recently introduced by Senators Chris Van Hollen and Marco
Rubio would require the Director of National Intelligence to report on
foreign interference after each federal election and would call for sanctions
on foreign states caught meddling through misinformation campaigns or
hacking.295 In addition, the Federal Election Commission has proposed
extending the purchaser disclosure requirement for certain political and
campaign ads296 to online buys.297 Internationally, a number of countries
292. Cyber Fraud Bill Would Make Political ‘Fake News’ Against the Law, CBS L.A.
(Mar. 31, 2017, 10:46 AM), http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2017/03/31/cyber-fraud-billwould-make-political-fake-news-against-the-law/.
293. See Ryan J. Foley, Alarmed by Fake News, Schools Push Media Literacy, KPCC
(Dec. 30, 2017), https://www.scpr.org/news/2017/12/30/79400/fake-news-schools-medialiteracy/; Chris Nichols, Stalled Bill to Help California Schools Fight Fake News to Be
Revived, CAPITOL PUB. RADIO (Dec. 11, 2017), http://www.capradio.org/articles/2017/12/11/
stalled-bill-to-help-california-schools-fight-fake-news-to-be-revived/.
294. See Steven T. Dennis, Senators Propose Social-Media Ad Rules After Months of
Russia Probes, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 19, 2017, 4:49 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-10-19/russia-probes-spur-lawmakers-on-election-security-social-media. In an
attempt to fend off such regulations, Facebook and other social media platforms voluntarily
implemented disclosure requirements of varying degrees. See, e.g., Tony Romm, Who’s
Behind Those Political Ads on Facebook? Now You Can Find Out., WASH. POST (May 24,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/05/24/whos-behindthose-political-ads-on-facebook-now-you-can-find-out/?noredirect=on&utm_term=
.61d7fd508c9c.
295. See Morgan Chalfant, Senators Unveil Bipartisan Push to Deter Future Election
Interference, HILL (Jan. 16, 2018, 7:30 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/369056bipartisan-senators-move-to-deter-future-election-interference.
296. See Advertising and Disclaimers, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-andcommittees/making-disbursements/advertising/ (last visited May 31, 2018).
297. See John Shinal, Tighter Rules for Online Political Ads Gain Momentum—But
Trump’s Tweets May Remain Disclaimer-Free, CNBC (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.cnbc.
com/2017/11/15/google-facebook-twitter-political-disclosure-fec-comments.html.
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have responded to the threat of fake news, including Germany, which has
required social media companies to delete hate speech,298 and France, which
has proposed legislation that would empower judges to remove and block
fake news during election periods and require the disclosure of ad
sponsors.299
Recommendations. It is beyond the scope of this article to assess the
myriad responses to combat the spread and influence of disinformation
online.300 It may be premature, in any event, to evaluate the
constitutionality of responses that continue to evolve in a technological catand-mouse game with the resources and sophistication of a foreign state,301
especially given that the marketplace impact of such foreign manipulation
is not sufficiently understood.302 But at least two responses seem consonant
with First Amendment doctrine and functions and worth pursuing on top of
any others that may also prove feasible and constitutional.
First, at a minimum, online platforms should work to uncover speech
affiliated with foreign states and disclose that affiliation to users. Platforms
are already attempting to do so voluntarily,303 and most likely could be
required to do so. While Citizens United generally barred discrimination on
the basis of speaker identity,304 the majority’s reservation of that rule with
respect to foreign speakers,305 coupled with the unanimous result in Bluman
298. See Melissa Eddy & Mark Scott, Delete Hate Speech or Pay Up, Germany Tells
Social Media Companies, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/
30/business/germany-facebook-google-twitter.html.
299. See James McAuley, France Weighs a Law to Rein In ‘Fake News,’ Raising Fears
for Freedom of Speech, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.washington
post.com/world/europe/france-weighs-a-law-to-rein-in-fake-news-raising-fears-for-freedomof-speech/2018/01/10/78256962-f558-11e7-9af7-a50bc3300042_story.html.
300. See Andrew Marvell, To His Coy Mistress, in MISCELLANEOUS POEMS 19 (London
1681) (“Had we but World enough, and Time . . . .”).
301. See Shane, supra note 15; Jackie Snow, Can AI Win the War Against Fake News?,
MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609717/can-ai-winthe-war-against-fake-news/.
302. See supra notes 262, 269 and accompanying text.
303. See Dennis, supra note 294; Romm, supra note 294; Valentina Palladino, YouTube
Will Put Disclaimers on State-Funded Broadcasts to Fight Propaganda, ARS TECHNICA
(Feb. 2, 2018, 9:51 AM), https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2018/02/youtube-will-putdisclaimers-on-state-funded-broad
casts-to-fight-propaganda/.
304. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340, 350 (2010).
305. See id. at 362 (“We need not reach the question whether the government has a
compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or associations from influencing our
Nation’s political process.”).
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upholding the ban on foreign political contributions,306 suggests that
Keene’s earlier approval of a registration and labeling requirement for
political speech from foreign powers307 remains a viable doctrinal source of
support for similar or less restrictive disclosure requirements. Certainly, the
constitutionality of applying the FEC’s narrower political and campaign ad
disclosure requirements to online platforms308 does not seem in doubt after
Citizens United broadly reaffirmed support for them.309
Furthermore, the disclosure of political speech by foreign nations,
particularly in the electoral context, seems consistent with the truth-seeking
and self-governance functions of the First Amendment in “enabl[ing] the
electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different
speakers and messages.”310 Speaker identity generally can be a valuable
indicator to listeners of credibility, quality, knowledge, motivation, and
reliability,311 and the identity of a foreign-state speaker can greatly impact
each of these trust factors. At the same time, because foreign nations
themselves do not possess any First Amendment interests312—including any
anonymity, autonomy, or self-governance interests—compelling the
disclosure of their identity would not impose any speaker-side harms to
offset the benefits of disclosure to listeners. Moreover, those truth-seeking
and self-governance benefits matter even more to the extent that, as
Professor Helen Norton argues, there is less First Amendment value and
greater harm in deliberate lies by foreign governments.313 But it remains to
be seen whether voluntary or compelled disclosures could effectively ferret
out the identities of sophisticated actors adept at obfuscating them,
particularly given the sheer volume of potentially suspect content on major
social platforms like Facebook.314
Second, to paraphrase Uncle Ben, with great rights comes great
responsibility.315 A robust right to receive foreign information and ideas
arguably comes with a social duty to consume them with discernment.
While it may be difficult to change the consumption preferences and trust
306. See Bluman v. FEC, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012).
307. See supra notes 118–122 and accompanying text.
308. See Shinal, supra note 297.
309. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–71.
310. Id. at 370.
311. See Norton, supra note 41, at 131 (“[L]isteners often use the speaker’s identity as a
proxy for the message’s quality and credibility.”).
312. See supra Part II.
313. Norton, supra note 41, at 120-21.
314. See Shane, supra note 15.
315. See SPIDER-MAN (Columbia Pictures Corp. 2002).
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inclinations of the most avid adult consumers of fake news,316 “the
processes of education” may “avert the evil” of “falsehood and fallacies” if
offered earlier.317 A K-12 media literacy curriculum designed to teach
students to critically assess the quality of content and the credibility of
sources could give the next generation of the electorate the skills needed to
grapple with increasingly complex streams of information at their
disposal.318 That education could continue in college as an elective or as
part of a core curriculum, and potentially beyond college as part of
professional or continuing education offerings.319
As noted, a number of states are considering or already creating media
literacy education curricula.320 Other nations have started doing so as
well.321 This early and ongoing prophylactic approach may not inoculate the
nation against meddling in the next several election cycles, but it could
prove more durable in the long run against continually evolving forms and
modes of disinformation by improving the savviness of buyers in the
marketplace of ideas.322 And educating listeners to better discern for
themselves the value and veracity of the information and ideas that they
consume from speakers worldwide furthers the truth-seeking, selfgovernance, and self-realization ends of the First Amendment.
VI. Conclusion
A First Amendment right to receive information and ideas has gained
doctrinal solidity and scope over the course of the past century. Outside of
the campaign finance and physical border-crossing contexts, the robust
316. See Clement & Borchers, supra note 291; Allcott & Gentzkow, supra note 22, at
218.
317. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
318. See Educator Resources, CTR. FOR MEDIA LITERACY, http://www.medialit.org/
educator-resources (last visited Apr. 12, 2018).
319. See Universities with Courses in News or Media Literary, CTR. FOR NEWS
EXCELLENCE & ENGAGEMENT, http://www.news-excellence.org/universities-with-courses-innews-or-media-literacy/ (last visited June 1, 2018).
320. See generally Foley, supra note 293; Nichols, supra note 293.
321. See, e.g., Jason Horowitz, In Italian Schools, Reading, Writing and Recognizing
Fake News, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/\world/
europe/italy-fake-news.html.
322. See Nina Jankowicz, The Only Way to Defend Against Russia’s Information War,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/opinion/the-only-wayto-defend-against-russias-information-war.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&click
Source=story-heading&module=opinion-c-col-left-region&region=opinion-c-col-left-region
&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-left-region.
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right now likely ensures uninhibited marketplace access to speech
regardless of the foreign identity or location of the speaker and likely also
extends to false political speech from abroad. As fate would have it, this
right to receive information and ideas peaked at the same moment when
massive social media networks such as Facebook offered the means for
disseminating falsehoods far and wide, and a foreign adversary had the
motive and sophistication to do so covertly during a closely contested
presidential election.
In the aftermath of this perfect free speech storm, it is an urgent,
existential question whether our de facto free speech infrastructure should
remain widely open to speech from abroad, particularly from foreign
adversaries intent on weaponizing speech to sway electoral outcomes or
sow social discord. This Article concludes that it is generally consistent
with First Amendment precedents and functions to leave the electorate free
to receive foreign information and ideas, and indeed essential to enjoy that
exposure in matters of foreign policy and other issues of global concern.
Further study is required, however, on the electoral and social effects of
large-scale disinformation campaigns—such as Russia’s during the 2016
election—before any firm conclusions can be drawn as to the desirability,
efficacy, and constitutionality of restrictions on access to fake news and
other falsehoods by foreign speakers.
For the time being, without restricting the public’s access to foreign
information and ideas, it is advisable at least to work toward technological
and policy solutions for identifying and disclosing speech affiliated with
foreign states. Furthermore, in addition to any other responses that might
merit consideration against what are certain to be continually evolving
operations to disrupt our domestic marketplace of ideas, teaching media
literacy from grade school onward might yield an effective and durable
long-term solution. It is also a solution that supports the truth-seeking,
democracy-facilitating, and self-realizing functions of the First Amendment
that underlay the right to receive information and ideas.
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